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I. INTRODUCTION
Taxes, as we learned in grade school, kindled the American Revolution.
Revolt against collecting revenues without representation caused a tea party,
propelling the colonies towards convening the First Continental Congress.
Forgotten, though, is the role of taxes in shaping our fledgling nation
immediately after the Revolution. Debates over which governmental body
could impose taxes inflamed the delegates to the Constitutional Convention. So
important was the issue that the decision to originate revenue bills in the lower
house of Congress constituted a cornerstone of the Great Compromise, thus
birthing the representational structure of our country. This principle became
embodied in the Constitution as the Origination Clause,' ensuring that the
power to tax would begin with the house that was directly elected and
proportionate to the population.
Tax treaties (generally, bilateral instruments that mitigate or eliminate
double taxation of income across jurisdictions) have become an important and
frequently used coordination device between countries, with the United States
entering into nearly seventy such instruments,2 yet they upset this intra-
congressional balance. Tax treaties are considered to be self-executing,
meaning that they need no implementing legislation to take legal effect. As a
result, the ratification of a tax treaty cuts the House of Representatives wholly
out of the process of promulgating policy in the area of international taxation,
in apparent derogation of the Origination Clause. Yet the Treaty Clause also
bestows upon the Senate sole authority to assent to treaties generally,3 thus
creating a constitutional puzzle, in the case of tax treaties, that has yet to
receive any analysis or sustained treatment in the academic literature.4 In this
I. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. I ("All Bills for raising Revenue shall originate in the House of
Representatives; but the Senate may propose or concur with Amendments as on other Bills.").
2. Allison Christians, How Nations Share, 87 IND. L.J. 1407, 1419 (2012) ("Currently, the
United States has income tax treaties with sixty-eight countries . . . .").
3. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 ("[The President] shall have Power, by and with the Advice
and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators present concur .... ).
4. I have uncovered only a few, brief references to the issue in works addressing other subject
matters. See AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA'S CONSTITUTION: A BIOGRAPHY 592 n.38 (2005) (briefly
positing that implementing legislation may be required for treaties in areas of "special sensitivity," such
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Article, I canvass the historical foundations and doctrinal developments of the
Origination Clause and the Treaty Clause. After so doing, I conclude that tax
treaties indeed create constitutional infirmities.
The text, history, and structure of the Clause, together with judicial
precedent and normative concerns, mandate House participation as an exclusive
means of enacting tax laws.5 Specifically, tax treaties fall within the scope of
the Origination Clause because they directly impact government revenues.
Moreover, a widely accepted proposition among practitioners and the Internal
Revenue Service-that tax treaties do not violate the Origination Clause
because they do not increase tax liability-is mistaken.6  Constitutional
analysis, including existing case law, and important practical concerns overturn
this view. The "raising Revenue" language of the Clause encompasses laws that
predominantly involve revenue, either through tax increases or decreases. The
as taxing and spending); Bruce Ackerman & David Golove, Is NAFTA Constitutional?, 108 HARv. L.
REv. 799, 923 (1995) (noting in passing that the Origination Clause may strengthen the argument that
NAFTA is constitutional); Chandler P. Anderson, The Extent and Limitations of the Treaty-making
Power Under the Constitution, 1 AM. J. INT'L L. 636, 653 (1907) ("The views expressed in Congress, as
above outlined, and by authoritative writers on the subject, show a consensus of opinion that with
respect, at least, to the appropriation of money and the regulation of tariff duties treaty stipulations
cannot be regarded as self-executing, and require legislative action to carry them into effect."); Edwin D.
Dickinson, Are the Liquor Treaties Self-Executing?, 20 AM. J. INT'L L. 444, 449 (1926) ("Legislative
practice would indicate that treaties involving a modification of the revenue laws are also in the same
category [as those treaties requiring implementing legislation], though in principle the case is not so
clear."); Leslie Henry, When Is a Treaty Self-Executing, 27 MICH. L. REv. 775, 780 (1929) ("[T]ariff
provisions are usually said to need action by Congress."); Yuji Iwasawa, The Doctrine ofSelf-Executing
Treaties in the United States: A Critical Analysis, 26 VA. J. INT'L L. 627, 677 (1986) ("It is also not clear
whether treaties affecting revenue laws can be self-executing."); Laurence H. Tribe, Taking Text and
Structure Seriously: Reflections on Free-Form Method in Constitutional Interpretation, 108 HARv. L.
REv. 1221, 1261 n.133 (1995) (noting that the Origination Clause may place limits on treaties involving
revenues but disagreeing with Ackerman and Golove that House participation justifies the use of
congressional-executive agreements); Quincy Wright, Treaties and the Constitutional Separation of
Powers in the United States, 12 AM. J. INT'L L. 64, 68-69 (1918) ("Although the competence of the
treaty power has been clearly established by practice, the necessity of congressional action to carry out
treaties affecting the revenue has usually been recognized, the negotiated instrument itself sometimes
providing that it shall not become valid until the necessary legislation has been passed."); William C.
Gordon, Comment, Self-Executing Treaties-The Genocide Convention, 48 MICH. L. REV. 852, 854 n. 12
(1949) ("A treaty may even affect revenue matters and be self-executing, so long as money need not be
appropriated."); cf Anthony C. Infanti, Curtailing Tax Treaty Overrides: A Call to Action, 62 U. PITT.
L. REv. 677, 709 (2001) (arguing that the House's involvement in passing tax treaty overrides is in
tension with the Treaty Clause).
5. In light of the strong constitutional and normative reasons for enacting international tax
agreements through implementing legislation or congressional-executive agreements, it is perhaps
surprising that current practice pursues neither. The House frequently defended its right to implement
tax treaties during the early part of the country's history yet no longer does so. The House's ostensible
failure to defend its turf in the tax treaty area might suggest that little harm is done from its omission in
the tax treaty process. As I discuss below, however, the House's current silence arises from historical
happenstance and should not be dismissed as acquiescence. See infra notes 285-294 and accompanying
text.
6. This practice is thought to avoid the Clause's mandate that "[aIll Bills for raising Revenue
originate in the House of Representatives." U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 7, cl. 1 (emphasis added); see, e.g., U.S.
DEP'T OF TREAS., TECHNICAL EXPLANATION OF THE U.S.-U.K. TAx CONVENTION 2 (2002) ("[The]
Convention may not increase the tax burden on a resident of a Contracting State beyond the burden
determined under domestic law."); Jeffrey A. Schoenblum, Bilateral Transfer Tax Treaties, Tax Mgmt.
Portfolios (BNA) No. 851 (2012) (nothing that it is routinely accepted among tax professionals that, in
order to comply with the Origination Clause, tax treaties cannot increase tax liability).
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precaution of limiting treaties to the tax-decreasing context is thus ineffectual
protection against the constitutional violation.
Additionally, close reading of the case law interpreting the treaty power
supports the view that such power is bound by certain constitutional limits,
which, I argue, include the origination privilege. The Origination Clause thus
functions as a constitutional constraint upon the Senate's treaty power. To
avoid the enactment of constitutionally suspect tax treaties and to preserve the
salient principles embodied in the Origination Clause, I argue that tax treaties
must not be self-executing but instead must be implemented through legislation
passed by both houses or else be approved as congressional-executive
agreements. By enhancing the deliberative process of tax treaties, the remedies
suggested herein support democratic principles. Although this is an important
normative consideration in and of itself, it is especially convincing given the
goal at the Founding to bring tax law closer to the people.
Because tax treaties currently benefit very few taxpayers at the cost of the
general public, they implicate the democratic concerns motivating the
Origination Clause. Adding to this problematic dynamic, unlike in the domestic
context, these tax expenditures wholly escape the budgetary process. The
remedies suggested herein would properly enlist budgetary rules such that
Congress could weigh a tax treaty's costs and benefits. The increased
deliberation and vetogates provided by House involvement would subject tax
treaties to a more robust, democratic process, improving their quality. The
creation of bicameralism in the process where it was previously absent
increases coordination costs between the House and Senate, thereby possibly
reducing special interest deals. Moreover, the remedies would give Congress
opportunities to clarify the purposes of tax treaties, perhaps supplanting the
traditional double taxation justification with more relevant concerns such as the
increase in investment flows between countries and the protection of the United
States revenue base. The failure of tax treaties to address such economic goals
in a coherent fashion directly reflects the paucity of the process to which they
are subject. In these respects, features of today's legislative and treaty
environments have made the democratic concerns motivating the Clause even
more acute, in sharp contrast to those principles underlying the Treaty Clause,
such as secrecy concerns and the protection of regional interests, which have
fallen away in modem times.
Requiring implementing legislation or approval through congressional-
executive agreements would allow the nation not only to honor our
Constitution but also to better uphold the nation's obligations under
international law, creating certainty for public and private actors alike. It may
decrease statutory overrides of tax treaties, a phenomenon partially resulting
from the House's jealous, albeit well-founded, guardianship over tax matters.
Additionally, these prescribed remedies would brace tax treaties against
challenges to their binding effect. This benefit is especially important in light of
4 [Vol. 38: 1
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increasing willingness by courts to uphold such challenges.7  Although
implementing legislation or congressional-executive agreements would be a
dramatic deviation from tax treaty-making in the United States, it is nothing
new for numerous other nations. Treaty partners would likely view this
additional requirement to the American treaty-making process as rather
unremarkable. Considering the benefits from stabilizing the international tax
landscape, they may even welcome it.
Although the constitutionality of self-executing tax treaties has not
received significant scholarly attention, the constitutionality of self-executing
treaties, in general, has been the subject of much debate.9 Scholars on both
sides of the debate admit that there is a likely exception for those treaties that
are within Congress's exclusive province because they raise separation-of-
powers concerns, although they do not attempt to enumerate or justify those
exceptions.' 0 With respect to tax treaties, this Article fills that gap in the
literature by arguing that the Origination Clause's unique set of exclusive
procedures and its rich ties to democratic concerns justify the long-held
intuition that tax treaties are, indeed, non-self-executing." This analysis thus
has implications beyond the context of tax treaties by shedding light on the
vexing question of whether and when the Constitution limits the reach of
treaties in general.
In Part II of this Article, I canvass the history, scope, and justiciability of
the Origination Clause. I then trace the history and meaning of the Treaty
Clause, with particular attention to the domestic legal status of treaties. Having
7. See Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491 (2008); see also Oona A. Hathaway, Sabria McElroy
& Sara Aronchick Solow, International Law at Home: Enforcing Treaties in U.S. Courts, 37 YALE J.
INT'L L. 51, 71-76 (2012) (finding that, post-Medellin, the lower courts have applied a presumption
against self-execution for categories of treaties that prior to Medellin were presumed self-executing).
8. In the United Kingdom, Ireland, Malta, and Australia, the legislative branch must pass
legislation in order for treaties to become part of domestic law. In most other democratic states, the
legislative branch also participates in the treaty-making process by passing a resolution or legislation
providing prior consent to the treaty's subsequent enactment. Klaus Vogel, The Domestic Law
Perspective, in TAX TREATIES AND DOMESTIC LAW 3, 4-5 (Guglielmo Maisto ed., 2006). Indeed, the
United States "is in the distinct minority in excluding a part of the legislature that is usually involved in
domestic lawmaking from international lawmaking, and it is among a small handful of countries that
combine the latter feature with a rule that makes treaties automatically a part of the domestic law." Oona
A. Hathaway, Treaties' End: The Past, Present, and Future of International Lawmaking in the United
States, 117 YALE L.J. 1236, 1274, 1309 (2008) (remarking that the United States, Mexico, and Tajikistan
comprise that latter category).
9. See, e.g., Martin S. Flaherty, History Right?: Historical Scholarship, Original
Understanding, and Treaties As "Supreme Law of the Land," 99 COLUM. L. REV. 2095 (1999)
(defending the view that treaties are self-executing); Vasan Kesavan, The Three Tiers of Federal Law,
100 Nw. U. L. REV. 1479 (2006) (arguing that, in addition to treaties within Congress's exclusive
powers, treaties that conflict with existing statutory law are non-self-executing); Carlos Manuel
Vizquez, Laughing at Treaties, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 2154 (1999) (arguing that treaties are self-
executing); John C. Yoo, Globalism and the Constitution: Treaties, Non-Self-Execution, and the
Original Understanding, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1955 (1999) (contending that treaties on the subject of one
of Congress's enumerated powers are not self-executing) [hereinafter Yoo, Globalism]; John C. Yoo,
Treaties and Public Lawmaking: A Textual and Structural Defense of Non-Self-Execution, 99 COLUM.
L. REv. 2218 (1999) (same) [hereinafter Yoo, Treaties and Public Lawmaking].
10. Kesavan, supra note 9, at 1505-06 (reviewing internationalist literature).
11. See id. at 1505 (citing, among others, RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS
LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 111 cmt. i & reporters' n.6 (1987)).
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laid out the constitutional first principles underlying the Origination Clause and
the Treaty Clause, I provide in Part III a general overview of tax treaties. In
Part IV, I set forth the position that self-executing tax treaties impermissibly
circumvent the Origination Clause, examining textual, historical, precedential,
and normative considerations. I then defend my thesis against possible counter-
arguments by arguing, for instance, that the last-in-time rule, in which a latter
enacted statute can trump a previously ratified treaty, provides insufficient
protection against the House's constitutional right to originate legislation.
Finally, in Part V, I detail the implementation of my solutions.
II. THE TENSION BETWEEN THE ORIGINATION AND TREATY CLAUSES
This Part first examines the historical foundations of the relevant clauses
of the Constitution, the Origination Clause and the Treaty Clause, including the
latter's interplay with the Supremacy Clause.12 These clauses relate in complex
manners, many of which were unforeseen by the Framers. Hence, this Part also
analyzes the doctrinal developments and congressional precedents that help to
explain such interactions. The conclusions drawn from these inquiries lay the
groundwork for the central thesis of the Article.
In particular, I show that (1) the Framers intended the Origination Clause
to protect the interests of the populace and to counterbalance the power of the
small states; (2) the Origination Clause-justiciable by the courts and enforced
by the House-continues to play an important role in the tax legislative
process; (3) the Treaty Clause also served a central, although purely historical,
purpose of giving the power over foreign affairs to the house with the then
greater international expertise and ensuring the interests of the states were
protected; and (4) neither originalist sources nor the Constitution suggest that
the Treaty Clause overrides the Origination Clause. As to the latter point, in
Part IV, I draw upon subsequent case law, congressional practice, and
normative considerations to show that the Treaty Clause must give way to the
Origination Clause in the context of tax treaties.
12. In conducting a historical examination of these clauses, I consult "the canonical originalist
sources," such as "the records of the constitutional convention, the ratification debates, The Federalist,
and early governmental practice." Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Interring the Nondelegation
Doctrine, 69 U. CHI. L. REv. 1721, 1733 (2002). In so doing, however, I do not attempt to reconstruct the
Framers' singular intent on the issue of tax treaties as self-executing devices. Such an intent did not exist
at the Founding, which predated tax treaties by a hundred years. Instead, I use these materials, along
with constitutional text and structure, to construct the most convincing constitutional interpretation. In
so doing, I do not reject the idea of a "living constitution," one that, while focusing on constitutional text
and structure, as well as the originalist sources, understands the Constitution as being applied in new
situations, necessitating evolving meaning. See, e.g., Jack M. Balkin, Framework Originalism and the
Living Constitution, 103 Nw. U. L. REv. 549 (2009) (arguing that originalism and living
constitutionalism are compatible rather than opposed). Indeed, much of my argumentation focuses on
normative justifications for protecting the House's prerogative in the tax treaty context.
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A. History and Interpretations of the Origination Clause
1. The Role of the Origination Clause in the Great Compromise
Article I, Section 7 of the Constitution-perhaps most well-known for
setting forth the bicameralism and presentment requirements that form the
constitutional bedrock of the legislative process -contains an opening clause,
referred to as the Origination Clause, which commands that revenue-raising
bills begin in the House of Representatives. The Origination Clause served as a
central element of the Great Compromise of 1787, which, in turn, saved the
constitutional enterprise by defining the legislative structure and representation
in a manner that appeased both large and small states. 14 The Great
Compromise, as the Supreme Court has stated, "was considered so important
by the Framers that they inserted a special provision to ensure that it could not
be altered, even by constitutional amendment, except with the consent of the
states affected."15
The Constitutional Convention itself was called primarily to bestow upon
Congress the power to raise revenue in response to huge debts incurred by the
new government. Although there was a consensus view in favor of the need for
a federal taxing power, the process by which Congress would tax proved highly
controversial and was the subject of many debates, votes, and revisions. 1 The
final version of the Origination Clause reads as follows: "All Bills for raising
Revenue shall originate in the House of Representatives; but the Senate may
propose or concur with Amendments as on other Bills." 7 The practice of
originating revenue bills in the lower house traces its history to fourteenth-
century England. Since that time, the elected House of Commons originated
revenue bills with the subsequent agreement by the House of Lords, which was
appointed by the crown.18 The rationale for the rule was that the lower house
was in closer communication with the citizens, and thus its members were in a
better position to judge the optimal level of taxation-that is, one that would
produce sufficient revenue while avoiding a perception of being onerous.19
Additionally, due to its direct accountability to the people, a lower house was
presumably reluctant to levy arbitrary taxes.20
13. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 7, cl. 2; INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983) (holding that a one-
House legislative veto violates the bicameralism and presentment clauses of Article 1, Section 7,
Clause 2).
14. 2 GEORGE TUCKER CURTIS, HISTORY OF THE ORIGIN, FORMATION, AND ADOPTION OF THE
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 216-17 (1863); Forrest McDonald & Michael Mendle, The
Historical Roots of the Originating Clause of the U.S. Constitution: Article I, Section 7, 27 MOD. AGE
274 (1983) (analyzing the role of Origination Clause in Constitutional Convention).
15. Chadha, 462 U.S. at 950 n.15.
16. See Jonathan Rosenberg, Comment, The Origination Clause, the Tax Equity and Fiscal
Responsibility Act of 1982, and the Role of the Judiciary, 78 Nw. U. L. REV. 419,422-23 (1983).
17. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 1.
18. DAVID K. WATSON, 1 THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES: ITS HISTORY,
APPLICATION, AND CONSTRUCTION 342 (1910); JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION
§§ 874-75 (Edmund H. Bennet ed., Little Brown 1858) (1833).
19. See STORY, supra note 18, § 875.
20. See id.
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Out of adherence to the principles underlying the English rule, the
American colonies adopted a custom whereby revenue bills originated in the
lower house. 2 1 Of the eleven states adopting new constitutions after the
revolution, seven had some version of the origination privilege.22 Given this
history, one could conclude that the framers were reflexively adopting the
English rule in adding the Origination Clause to the Constitution. Subsequent
debates during the Convention, however, suggest otherwise. 23 Indeed, the
evolution of the clause indicates it was adopted not only to bestow power over
revenue matters to the directly elected house, thereby increasing government
accountability of a populist sort, but also, according to contemporaneous
sources, to serve as a counterweight to the special powers granted to the
Senate.24 James Madison, in a speech to the newly formed House of
Representatives on May 15, 1789, highlighted the democratic reasons for the
Clause but also recounted that the structure of the House itself was due to its
power to originate revenue bills:
The constitution ... places the power in the House of originating money bills.
The principal reason . .. was [] because [its members] were chosen by the
People, and supposed to be best acquainted with their interests, and ability. In
order to make them more particularly acquainted with these objects, the
democratic branch of the Legislature consisted of a greater number, and were
chosen for a shorter period, so that they might revert more frequently to the
mass of the People.25
Early in the Convention, the Clause was readily rejected, with only
delegates from Delaware, New York, and Virginia voting in its favor. 26 These
few proponents argued that the direct and more proportional representatives of
the people should be the ones to "hold the purse strings" of the nascent
country.27 Its opposition successfully argued that enforceability would be a
problem and would create conflict between the houses.28 Even after several
subsequent defeats of the clause, proposals continuously arose in the context of
the division of power between the Senate and the House. On July 5, 1787, the
21. WATSON, supra note 18, at 343.
22. Two of the eleven states had no bicameral legislature. Michael B. Rappaport, The
President's Veto and the Constitution, 87 Nw. U. L. REv. 735, 765 n. 118 (1993). The states with
origination privileges were divided over whether to allow the upper house to amend revenue legislation.
Id.; see also Rebecca M. Kysar, The "Shell Bill" Game (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author)
(discussing history of the Senate's power to amend revenue legislation).
23. During the constitutional debates, some contended that the Origination Clause's inclusion
in the Constitution simply reflected a matter of custom. See WILLIAM M. MEIGS, THE GROWTH OF THE
CONSTITUTION IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 108 (1987).
24. THE FEDERALIST No. 66, at 370-72 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1999)
(defending the Senate's powers on a quid pro quo basis with those of the House, including the
origination power); see also Rosenberg, supra note 16, at 429 ("If not for the origination clause, the
delegates from the large states likely would never have agreed to vest the Senate with such critical
powers as the treatymaking power and the appointment power.").
25. 3 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 356 (Max Farrand ed., rev. ed.
in four vol. 1966).
26. CHARLES WARREN, THE MAKING OF THE CONSTITUTION 275-77,277 n.1 (1928).
27. Id. at 275 (statement of Mr. Gerry).
28. JAMES MADISON, DEBATES ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION IN THE
CONVENTION HELD AT PHILADELPHIA IN 1789, at 188-89 (Jonathan Elliot ed., J.B. Lippincott Co. 1891)(1845) (statement of General Pinckney).
8 [Vol. 38: 1
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Convention's Compromise Committee recommended the Great Compromise,
which would trade equal representation of the States in the Senate for the
exclusive right of the House to originate money bills. 29 The version of this
resolution gave no amendment powers to the Senate. 30
Initially, the Framers were divided as to which body benefitted the most
from this quid pro quo. The clause's persistence throughout the negotiations
indicates that the Framers believed the ability to initiate the legislative agenda
to be extremely valuable.31 And by refusing to give this power to the house
further removed from the people, the Framers intended to protect the country
from being perceived as an aristocracy. 32
Nevertheless, concerns over the practicalities of the Origination Clause
remained, including the interpretation of its scope.33  To cure these
shortcomings, a proposal was drafted such that the clause only applied to bills
whose purpose was to raise revenue, in response to the objection that all bills
that had incidental effects on the Treasury would be subject to the clause. 34
Additionally, the proposal gave the Senate the power to amend the bills,
perhaps to quell concerns that the upper house needed to correct errors and to
protect its purview over foreign matters.35
The final form of the Origination Clause, with the Senate's ability to
amend and a general aim at "bills for raising revenue," was incorporated two
months after the Great Compromise. 36 Although the small states had already
bargained for the crucially important benefit of equal representation in the
Senate, the House's power under the Origination Clause was perceived as so
important that bestowal of the rest of the Senate's powers relating to executive
appointment, treaty-making, impeachment, and presidential elections was
necessary to reach a final agreement. 37 The governmental structure of the
fledgling nation was in this way formed. So understood, the Origination Clause
served two purposes. First, the Origination Clause acted as a counterbalance to
the powers secured to the small states in the Senate. Second, the Origination
Clause served the interests of the people by securing a prominent role for the
29. Although some members contended that the Origination Clause had not been part of the
compromise, those who advocated for its conclusion considered it to be essential to the deal. Id. at 394,
396, 414-20.
30. See generally Kysar, supra note 22 (providing a general overview of the Senate's power to
amend revenue legislation and the separation of powers concerns that mandate a broad judicial
interpretation of such power).
31. Rosenberg, supra note 16, at 426-27. Political scientists have explored the importance of
agenda setting, most often in the executive branch context. See, e.g., STEPHEN J. WAYNE, THE
LEGISLATIVE PRESIDENCY 16 (1978) (arguing that the President enjoys agenda-setting power in
promulgating the annual budget); Lars Willnat, Agenda-Setting and Priming: Conceptual Links and
Diferences, in COMMUNICATION AND DEMOCRACY: EXPLORING THE INTELLECTUAL FRONTIERS
IN AGENDA-SETTING THEORY 58 (Maxwell E. McCombs, Donald L. Shaw & David Weaver eds.,
1997).
32. MADISON,supra note 28, at 418 (statement of Mr. Dickinson).
33. Rosenberg, supra note 16, at 426.
34. MEIGS, supra note 23, at 112.
35. MADISON, supra note 28, at 415 (statement of George Mason).
36. Id. at 510; MEIGS, supra note 23, at 108.
37. MADISON, supra note 28, at 510-11.
2013] 9
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directly elected house, which was also subject to proportional representation
and more frequent elections, in setting revenue policy.
2. Judicial Interpretations of the Origination Clause
The history of the Origination Clause illuminates its importance and
meaning. Yet the Framers spoke little of how the clause was to be interpreted.
The discussion below of the relevant case law and congressional precedents
will help somewhat to fill the gaps, although much has been left open by the
courts and Congress.
a. The Scope of the Clause and Justiciability
The Supreme Court has had occasion to speak to the meaning of the
Origination Clause only a handful of times but it has developed two rules that
tend to narrow its application: (1) raising revenue must be the primary purpose,
rather than an incidental consequence, of the legislation; and (2) such revenues
must be for the general government coffers.38 The Supreme Court has also
broadly construed the Senate's amendment power, holding that the Senate's
substitution of a corporate tax for an inheritance tax in a House-originated bill
was germane to the subject matter of that bill and hence constituted an
amendment within the Senate's powers under the Origination Clause. 39
The most recent Supreme Court ruling to address the Origination Clause,
United States v. Munoz-Flores,40 involved a law requiring federal courts to
impose a monetary "special assessment" on those convicted of a misdemeanor,
which would be used, in part, to compensate victims of a crime. The Court held
that the program represented a transfer between criminals and victims rather
than a tax, although it did admittedly generate revenues.41 An interesting aspect
of Munoz-Flores was the Court's determination that the House was not the sole
enforcer of the Origination Clause. In the majority opinion, Justice Marshall
opined that:
Although the House certainly can refuse to pass a bill because it violates the
Origination Clause, that ability does not absolve this Court of its responsibility
to consider constitutional challenges to congressional enactments ... . Nor do
the House's incentives to safeguard its origination prerogative obviate the need
for judicial review.42
38. For a summary of these cases, see infra notes 151-166 and accompanying text. I have
discussed in detail elsewhere how the Court uses the second condition as a proxy for the first. See Kysar,
supra note 22.
39. Flint v. Stone Tracy Co., 220 U.S. 107, 143 (1911); see also Rainey v. United States, 232
U.S. 310, 317 (1914) (broadly construing the amendment power). As will be discussed infra Subsection
IV.B.4, in spite of the Court's broad reading of the amendment power, the House's power to originate
revenue bills still sets the starting point for negotiations over tax legislation; it is mistaken to read this
case law as rendering the Clause irrelevant.
40. 495 U.S. 385, 398 (1990).
41. Id. at 400-01 n.7.
42. Id. at 392 (citation omitted).
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Thus, unlike the House's other internal rules, the Origination Clause is
unwaivable and enforceable by the Court.43 That is to say that the Court can
strike down a bill in violation of the Origination Clause even though the House
has chosen to waive its origination privilege or has improperly found a bill to
be outside of the clause's reach. Under Munoz-Flores, the failure of the House
to assert its right to implement legislation for tax treaties in the modem era does
not cure constitutional violations.44
b. The Meaning of "Raising Revenue"
The Supreme Court is not the only judicial body to have struggled with
the proper interpretation of the Origination Clause. In the lower courts, a large
controversy concerning the Origination Clause began after passage of the Tax
Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982 (TEFRA). 45 These cases
collectively have been understood to stand for the proposition that "raising
revenue" for the purposes of the Origination Clause does not mean "increasing
revenue."46 In accordance with congressional practice, courts treat tax increases
as well as tax cuts as within the scope of the Origination Clause.
TEFRA originated in the House of Representatives as a tax cut, and hence
as a revenue-reducing act.47 The Senate, however, struck out the entirety of the
bill and substituted it with a tax increase, or revenue-raising act.48 One
influential TEFRA case, Armstrong v. United States,49 involved a taxpayer
seeking a refund of a portion of the tax assessed by TEFRA. The taxpayer
asserted that the Origination Clause applied only to bills that increase taxes. For
that reason, the taxpayer argued, TEFRA did not become such a bill until it
originated in the Senate, in violation of the Origination Clause.so
The Ninth Circuit rejected that construction of the Origination Clause,
holding that the House properly originated the bill.5 ' Specifically, the court of
appeals concluded that the Origination Clause applied to "all laws relating to
taxes" for several reasons.52 Its interpretation has been affirmed by four other
43. See Rebecca M. Kysar, Lasting Legislation, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 1007, 1021-25 (2011)
(discussing the endogeneity, i.e., the necessity of self-interpretation and self-enforcement by the
adopting body, of legislative rules); Rebecca M. Kysar, Listening to Congress: Earmark Rules and
Statutory Interpretation, 94 CORNELL L. REv. 519, 553-62 (2009) (providing an overview of legislative
rules in the context of special interest disclosure rules).
44. See infra notes 283-284 and accompanying text.
45. Pub. L. No. 97-248, 96 Stat. 324 (1982).
46. JAMES V. SATURNO, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 31399, THE ORIGINATION CLAUSE OF
THE U.S. CONSTITUTION: INTERPRETATION AND ENFORCEMENT 8 (2011).
47. Moore v. U.S. House of Representatives, 553 F. Supp. 267, 269-70 (D.D.C. 1982)
(recounting legislative history). The appellate court in Moore exercised remedial discretion to refuse to
grant relief to House members raising an Origination Clause issue. The court left open the possibility
that private taxpayers could bring Origination Clause challenges. Moore v. U.S. House of
Representatives, 733 F.2d 946, 956 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
48. Moore, 733 F.2d at 956.
49. 759 F.2d 1378 (9th Cir. 1985).
50. Id. at 1381.
51. Id. at 1381-82.
52. Id. at 1381.
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circuits53 and, as discussed below, supports the conclusion that tax treaties
improperly circumvent the Origination Clause even though they do not
uniformly increase taxes. 54
3. Congressional Interpretations of the Origination Clause
Congressional practice, perhaps no less than judicial interpretation, is
crucial to understanding the Origination Clause. The primary method by which
the Origination Clause is enforced is by a House resolution to return a bill to
the Senate (referred to as "blue-slipping" because the resolution was
55historically printed on blue paper). Although any member may deliver such a
resolution, typically the Chair of the Ways and Means Committee does so. The
consideration of the resolution by the House takes "precedence [over] all other
questions except motions to adjourn." 56 The House also informally enforces the
clause through several different methods, including: (1) by ignoring a Senate
passed revenue bill, instead taking action on a House bill;57 (2) by using a
conference committee to decide questions under the clause;58 or (3) by taking
up the bill yet excising the offending language. 59
The House's precedents have become important in defining whether a bill
is for raising revenue. In tension with case law holding otherwise, the House
at times assumes that all legislation that may affect revenue, and not just
legislation that does so directly, falls within the scope of the Origination
Clause.6 1 It also interprets the clause to include, as the case law above also
concludes, tax cuts.62 Historically, the House has issued blue-slips on a wide
53. Texas Association of Concerned Taxpayers, Inc. v. United States, 772 F.2d 163, 168 (5th
Cir. 1985); Wardell v. United States, 757 F.2d 203, 205 (8th Cir. 1985) (per curiam); Rowe v. United
States, 583 F. Supp. 1516, 1519 (D. Del. 1984), af'd mem., 749 F.2d 27 (3d Cir. 1984); Heitman v.
United States, 753 F.2d 33, 35 (6th Cir. 1984) (per curiam).
54. See infra notes 151-173 and accompanying text.
55. See H.R. Res. 6 104th Cong. Para. 106 (1995) (enacted as House Rule XXI cl. (5)(c)).
56. House Rule IX, cl. 2(a)(1).
57. 3 LEwIs DESCHLER, PRECEDENTS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ch. 13, § 18.1-18.5
[hereinafter DESCHLER'S PRECEDENTS].
58. 2 ASHER C. HINDS, PRECEDENTS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES OF THE UNITED
STATES ch. XLVII, § 1487 [hereinafter HINDS' PRECEDENTS].
59. SATURNO, supra note 46, at 9-10.
60. House precedents concerning the Origination Clause include the following: 6 CLARENCE
CANNON, CANNON'S PRECEDENTS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES OF THE UNITED STATES ch.
CLXXX (1935); DESCHLER'S PRECEDENTS, supra note 57, at ch. 13, pt. C; and 2 HINDS' PRECEDENTS,
supra note 58, at ch. XLVII. In addition, House actions to return Senate bills containing revenue
provisions for the 97th-106th Congresses may be found in H.R. Rep. No. 106-1036, at 100-05 (2000).
61. For instance, the House has blue-slipped a bill to require the President to impose import
restrictions on certain countries. See Privileges of the House-Returning to the Senate the Bill S. 254,
Violent and Repeat Juvenile Offender Accountability and Rehabilitation Act of 1999, 138 CONG. REC.
3332, 3377 (1992).
62. See Privileges of the House-Returning to the Senate the Bill S. 104, Nuclear Waste Policy
Act of 1982, 144 CONG. REC. H878-79 (daily ed. Mar. 5, 1999) (returning to the Senate a bill repealing a
fee that was determined by the House to have a direct, negative impact on revenues). Language from an
1872 Senate Committee Report, reprinted in the Precedents of the House of Representatives, comports
with this understanding:
Suppose the existing law lays a duty of 50 per cent upon iron. A bill repealing such law,
and providing that after a certain day the duty upon iron shall be only 40 per cent, is still a
bill for raising revenue, because that is the end in contemplation. Less revenue will be
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variety of legislative measures, including a concurrent resolution reinterpreting
portions of the Tariff Act of 1922; bills providing for an issuance of bonds; and
a bill exempting the Olympic Games from taxation. 6 3
The Senate also participates in determining the scope of the Origination
Clause, although to a much lesser extent than the House. Mostly, its precedents
serve to "underscore the House's interpretation of what constitutes revenue in a
constitutional sense."6 When the question whether a bill or amendment
violates the Origination Clause arises in the Senate, a point of order typically is
submitted by the Presiding Officer to the Senate Floor where the issue is
debated and decided by a simple majority.65 Most disagreement between the
two houses has concerned the Senate's authority to amend revenue bills. In the
nineteenth century, for instance, the House took the position that Senate
66
amendments had to be germane to the original bill. Current precedent,
however, recognizes that the Senate generally has the power to amend a House-
originated revenue bill without regard to germaneness, but that it may not
propose a revenue-related amendment to a non-revenue bill. 7
B. History and Interpretations of the Treaty Clause
1. The Role of the Treaty Clause at the Founding
In order to understand why self-executing tax treaties violate the
Constitution, it is necessary to also explore the meaning of the Treaty Clause.
The Treaty Clause, which is located in Article II, Section 2 of the Constitution,
declares that the President "shall have Power, by and with the Advice and
Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators
present concur." 68
Our task of ascertaining the meaning of this power and its relationship to
the Origination Clause begins, again, at the Founding. The records of the
debates at the Federal Convention indicate that Hamilton first proposed that the
treaty power be vested in the President and Senate as part of his plan for a
federal government. 69 The crisis over representation, however, foreclosed
consideration of presidential powers until after the Great Compromise was
raised than under the former law, still it is intended to raise revenue, and such a bill could
not constitutionally originate in the Senate, nor could such provisions be ingrafted, by
way of amendment, upon any House bill which did not provide for raising-that is,
collecting-revenue.
2 HINDS' PRECEDENTS, supra note 58, ch. XLVII, § 1489 (emphasis added) (quoting S. REP. No. 146
(1872)).
63. SATURNO, supra note 46, at 6.
64. Id. For instance, the Senate has sustained a point of order against a bill that paid revenues
into the general Treasury fund and has refused to consider a bill whose import limitations would have
directly affected tariffs. Id.
65. FLOYD M. RIDDICK & ALAN S. FRUMIN, RIDDICK'S SENATE PROCEDURE, S. Doc. 101-28,
at 685, 1215 (1992).
66. 2 HINDS' PRECEDENTS, supra note 58, §§ 1481, 1489.
67. SATURNO, supra note 46, at 1.
68. U.S. CONST. art. II, §2, cl. 2.
69. 1 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 25, at 292.
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70reached. Since the Great Compromise was understood as allocating power
reasonably among the large and small states, giving more power to the Senate
through the Treaty Clause after the agreement was struck proved
controversial.71 Eventually, delegates from the large states became persuaded
by the view of the small states that the gravity of the origination privilege
72justified granting additional powers to the Senate, including the treaty power.
Initial drafts of the Treaty Clause gave the treaty power to the Senate
alone, without participation by the Executive.7 3 Yet the exclusion of the
President was overshadowed by the more controversial omission of the
House.74 Numerous proposals were made by the larger states to include the
House.75 For instance, George Mason, in seconding a motion in favor of the
Origination Clause, did so in response to the possibility that the Senate could
"sell the whole Country by means of Treaties." 7 6 Others agreed with Mason,
going so far as to propose that the treaty power should be vested solely in the
Executive and asserting that, if the House is removed from the treaty-making
process, treaties should "not be final so as to alter the laws of the land, till
ratified by legislative authority."77
During formal debates over the Treaty Clause, however, the Framers
defeated a proposal that would have foreclosed treaties from being binding
until "ratified by a law."78 The opponents, including Madison, argued that
implementation would be inconvenient in matters of negotiating alliances and
peace treaties. Practice abroad became the subject of debate as some argued an
act of Parliament was necessary in order to effectuate Great Britain's treaty
obligations, while others disputed this characterization.79
Madison would hint that perhaps the House should participate only in
non-peace treaties, but the drafting committee did not take up this suggestion.80
One other relevant proposal was made and defeated, which would have
required both House and Senate involvement in the consent of treaties.8 1 The
primary objection to the latter proposal was the "necessity of secrecy in the
case of treaties" that forbade consideration of them by the whole Congress.82
After further debate over the supermajority requirement in the Treaty Clause,
the clause was approved in its current form. 83 Although the Treaty Clause was
70. Arthur Bestor, "Advice "from the Very Beginning, "Consent" When the End Is Achieved,
83 AM. J. INT'L L. 718, 722 (1989).
71. Id. at 723.
72. Rosenberg, supra note 16, at 428.
73. Bestor, supra note 70, at 722.
74. Id. at 723.
75. Id. at 724.
76. 2 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 25, at 297.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 392.
79. Id. at 393.
80. Id. at 394.
81. Id. at 538.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 550.
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a topic of consternation among the states during their ratifying conventions, no
amendments to the clause were adopted.84
In Federalist No. 64, John Jay justified the treaty power as one that must
be delegated to those who are "best qualified" and who will "afford the highest
security," particularly in the case of treaties relating to "war, peace, and
commerce."85 Jay further reasoned that, because Senators, at the time, were to
be chosen by select electors rather than directly elected, and because their terms
were longer and staggered, they would be best situated to represent national
interests. 86 Like the Framers during the debates of the Constitutional
Convention, Jay also explained that the treaty-making process, by confining it
to the smaller house, assured secrecy and immediacy.87 The House of
Representatives, Jay argued, was elected too frequently to understand national
concerns and, as a discontinuous body, should not be trusted with "great
affairs" given that there was no mechanism to ensure transmission of
information between successive Houses.88 Hamilton would, by and large,
reiterate Jay's rationales in Federalist No. 75, arguing that, because of their
composition and admission procedures, the Representatives would lack
knowledge of foreign politics, a national interest, and an ability to maintain
secrecy. Additionally, convening the representatives for the task of approving
treaties, Hamilton argued, would prove impracticable. 90
Regional interests also provided another dimension to the history of the
Treaty Clause. The supermajority requirement and involvement of the Senate
was regarded as a mechanism that would disable the federal government from
negotiating treaties against a particular region.91 In the Continental Congress, a
potential treaty with Spain would have given trade concessions that benefitted
northern commercial interests in exchange for navigation rights to the
Mississippi River that harmed the Western territories.92 The Western minority
of states successfully blocked the deal because of a supermajority requirement
in the Articles of Confederation, and the fresh memory of the incident would
mandate a similar protection of states' interests in the Constitution. The
carryover of the supermajority requirement from the Articles of Confederation,
as well as the states' equal representation in the Senate, prevented the Senate
from straying from the responsibility of representing the States.93 At the same
time, the Treaty Clause strengthened the ability of the national government to
overcome collective action problems and propagate international policy. 94
84. 3 STORY, supra note 18, § 1508.




89. THE FEDERALIST No. 75 (Alexander Hamilton).
90. Id.
91. Hathaway, supra note 8, at 1281-86; Henry P. Monaghan, Supremacy Clause Textualism,
110 COLUM. L. REV. 731, 748 (2010).
92. Hathaway, supra note 8, at 1281-82; Monaghan, supra note 91, at 748.
93. Hathaway, supra note 8, at 1283-85.
94. Id.
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What precisely does it mean for the Senate to provide "advice and
consent"? It has been suggested that the phrase was a technical term at the time
of the founding, which required "close and continuous consultation. . . between
a ruler and a council of state or privy council."95 Initially, President
Washington sought the advice of the Senate prior to treaty negotiations, but this
approach rapidly broke down by the end of his second term due to his
frustration with its inconvenience and impracticality. 96 Instead, Washington
began to ask for Senate approval subsequent to treaty negotiations.9 7 Today,
the Senate's power to provide consent essentially gives it veto power over
treaties, and primary negotiating responsibility continues to fall to the
President." The Senate's modem role involves the approval or rejection of
fully negotiated treaties by a two-thirds vote, at times conditioning its assent
upon acceptance of expressed reservations. 00
As we have seen, the history of the Treaty Clause might be marshaled to
conclude that implementing legislation is not constitutionally required. After
all, proposals to do just that were resoundingly rejected at the Convention.
Does this mean that the Treaty Clause does not require implementing
legislation in any context? In my view, the answer is almost certainly no. It is
difficult to read definitive meaning into the Framers' actions. First, the United
States would not enter into a treaty predominantly involving taxes for another
hundred years after the Founding, 101 and the modem bilateral income tax
treaty, the subject of this Article, would not exist until 1932.102 Thus, it may
have been nearly impossible for the Framers to have conceived of a treaty
predominantly involving revenue matters in the same manner as domestic
legislation. The evolution of the case law, normative considerations, and
congressional practice, however, cast self-executing tax treaties into
constitutional doubt. 103
95. Bestor, supra note 70, at 725.
96. Hathaway, supra note 8, at 1280.
97. Id.
98. See id. at 726-27.
99. Kevin C. Kennedy, Conditional Approval of Treaties by the U.S. Senate, 19 LOY. L.A.
INT'L & COMP. L.J. 89, 93-94 (1996); Stefan A. Riesenfeld & Frederick M. Abbott, The Scope of U.S.
Senate Control over the Conclusion and Operation of Treaties, 67 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 571, 579 (1991).
100. Kennedy, supra note 99, at 95.
101. H. David Rosenbloom & Stanley I. Langbein, United States Tax Treaty Policy, An
Overview, 19 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 359, 361 (1981).
102. Tax Convention, U.S.-Fr., Apr. 27, 1932,49 Stat. 3145.
103. See infra Part IV.
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2. The Relationship of Treaties to Domestic Law
a. When Do Treaties Require Implementing Legislation?
The Supremacy Clause is direct in its command: "This Constitution,
Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all
Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the United
States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land, and the Judges in every State
shall be bound thereby. . . ."' As set forth briefly above, the Supreme Court
has interpreted this language to mean that treaties have the power and effect of
domestic laws when, by their own terms, they operate without legislation or
are, in other words, self-executing.' 05 Specifically, the Court has reasoned that
because treaties are the law of the land, they are equivalent to legislative acts in
terms of judicial enforceability when they are self-executing. 106 Other treaties,
known as non-self-executing treaties, have domestic legal effect only after
Congress implements them through legislation.
The intent of the treaty-making nations generally determines whether the
treaty is self-executing.10 7 This judicial understanding of self-executing treaties
has been widely debated by scholars, with some arguing that the Supremacy
Clause expressly makes all treaties enforceable by courts, even when they are
silent on the issue,o and others contending that the constitutional history
prohibits self-executing treaties when the treaty abrogates Congress' Article I
109powers.
104. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
105. Although the precise meaning of "non-self-execution" is somewhat in dispute among
scholars, courts generally treat non-self-executing treaties as not enforceable by the judiciary. Curtis A.
Bradley, International Delegations, the Structural Constitution, and Non-Self Execution, 55 STAN. L.
REV. 1557, 1588 (2003). Some scholars have argued that non-self-execution means only that the treaty
fails to provide for a private right of action, thereby empowering courts to enforce treaties in situations
not requiring a private right of action. See, e.g., David Sloss, Non-Self-Executing Treaties: Exposing a
Constitutional Fallacy, 36 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1, 45 (2002). Professor Vdzquez has helpfully explained
that courts may refuse to enforce a treaty for various reasons. A treaty may require appropriations of
money or the creation of a crime, for instance, which lies within the exclusive province of Congress.
Others may be nonjusticiable due to standing requirements, a lack of a private right of action, or because
the treaty-makers' intent requires implementing legislation. See generally Carlos Manuel VAzquez, The
Four Doctrines of Self-Executing Treaties, 89 AM. J. INT'L. L. 695 (1995) [hereinafter VAzquez, The
Four Doctrines]; Carlos Manuel Vizquez, Treaties as Law of the Land: The Supremacy Clause and the
Judicial Enforcement of Treaties, 122 HARV. L. REV. 599, 602 (2008) [hereinafter VAzquez, Treaties as
Law of the Land]. In this Article, I generally refer to non-self-execution as the first type-taxes are
within Congress's exclusive province and therefore tax treaties cannot be judicially enforced as a
constitutional matter.
106. Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. 253, 254 (1829) (holding that a treaty governing Spanish land
grants in Florida was not self-executing).
107. CHRISTOPHER R. DRAHOZAL, THE SUPREMACY CLAUSE: A REFERENCE GUIDE TO THE
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 160 (2004) (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS
LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 114(a) (1987) (stating that treaties are .'non-self-executing' . . . if the
agreement manifests an intention that it shall not become effective as domestic law without the
enactment of implementing legislation.")).
108. See Flaherty, supra note 9; Vdzquez, The Four Doctrines, supra note 105, at 698-700;
Vizquez, supra note 9.
109. See Yoo, Globalism, supra note 9; Yoo, Treaties and Public Lawmaking, supra note 9, at
2255 (1999).
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A recent Supreme Court case, Medellin v. Texas, does little to settle the
academic debate, although it provides the most extended discussion of the self-
execution doctrine. In Medellin, the Court held that a treaty obligation to
comply with a decision of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) was not
enforceable by the Court because the treaty was not self-executing, judging
predominantly by its text and structure. 10
One might read the Medellin opinion to create a presumption against self-
execution, requiring clear language to the contrary before a treaty will be
enforceable without implementing legislation, and lower courts have indeed
done so.' Other scholars, however, have rejected such a reading, reasoning
instead that Medellin is consistent with a presumption in favor of self-
executionll2 or requires that self-execution "be resolved on a treaty-by-treaty
basis."" 3 Regardless of how the Court ultimately settles this debate, it seems to
have renewed its commitment to examine the text and surrounding
circumstances of the treaty in order to ascertain the intent of the United States
in determining judicial enforceability of a treaty.114 Because the Court has now
refused to enforce a treaty due to a lack of implementing legislation, it has also
incentivized the Senate and Executive branch to provide clearer statements with
regard to the self-execution of treaties," 5 including in the tax treaty context.1 16
The subject of this Article, however-whether tax treaties can be self-executing
as a constitutional matter-is a separate question.
b. The Constitution and Conflicting Treaties
Case law does not definitively resolve the important question of whether
the Treaty Clause is absolute or instead limited by other parts of the
Constitution. In Missouri v. Holland, the Supreme Court upheld the
implementation of a treaty against a Tenth Amendment challenge." Prior to
110. 552 U.S. 491 (2008). The Court also held that the President could not unilaterally force
state courts to comply with the ICJ decision since the treaty first needed to be implemented by a law
meeting the requirements of Article 1, Section 7. Id. at 526.
Ill. See Hathaway et al., supra note 7, at 71-76 (finding that, post-Medellin, the lower courts
have applied a presumption against self-execution for categories of treaties that, prior to Medellin, were
presumed self-executing). Prior to Medellin, scholars extensively debated whether and if a presumption
in favor of self-execution exists. See, e.g., Louis HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE UNITED STATES
CONSTITUTION 201 (2d ed. 1996); Flaherty, supra note 9, at 2128-29; Vizquez, supra note 9, at 2158;
Tim Wu, Treaties' Domains, 93 VA. L. REV. 571, 633-37 (2007) (finding a presumption of self-
execution in cases involving enforcement against states); Yoo, Globalism, supra note 9 (making a
constitutional case against a presumption of self-execution).
112. Vizquez, Treaties as Law ofthe Land, supra note 105, at 660.
113. Curtis A. Bradley, Intent, Presumptions, and Non-Self-Executing Treaties, 102 AM. J.
INT'L L. 540, 540-41 (2008) (reading the decision "as requiring self-execution to be resolved on a treaty-
by-treaty basis without resort to any general presumption").
114. Id. at 540.
115. Curtis A. Bradley, Self-Execution and Treaty Duality, 2008 SUP. CT. REv. 131, 182.
116. Although in the past, the Senate Finance Committee has included statements in its report
that tax treaties are self-executing, recently and in response to Medellin, the advice and consent
resolution of the Senate has formally recognized such treaties to be self-executing. See, e.g., S. Rep. No.
110-17, at 7 (2008) (consenting to the Tax Convention with Iceland subject to the declaration that the
Convention is self-executing).
117. 252 U.S. 416 (1920).
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the negotiation of the treaty, Congress passed a statute regulating the hunting of
migratory birds, which was struck down by two lower federal courts because it
was not within an enumerated power of Congress. The Justice Department tried
a different tactic by pushing a treaty between the United States and Canada that
would protect migratory birds, arguing that Congress could then reenact the
unconstitutional statute under its power to do what is "necessary and proper" to
carry the treaty power into execution.
Justice Holmes wrote that, in part because the treaty did not "contravene
any prohibitory words to be found in the Constitution," the Tenth Amendment
did not limit it. The Court went on to say that it did not "mean to imply that
there are no qualifications to the treaty-making power,"'1 9 although it gave no
indication what such limitations were. In dismissing the constitutional
challenge to the statute implementing the treaty, the Court effectively held that
the treaty power was one of the powers delegated to the federal government
and that the Tenth Amendment only reserved to the states non-delegated
powers. 12 In so holding, the Court implicitly concluded that Congress could
implement a non-self-executing treaty through legislation, even though
Congress lacked the power to enact the legislation in the non-treaty context.121
In a later case, Reid v. Covert, a plurality of the Court moved away from
Holland by rejecting the argument that a treaty could override individual rights
guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment in the Constitution, distinguishing
Holland as specific to the Tenth Amendment context.122 To hold otherwise, the
plurality reasoned, "would be manifestly contrary to the objectives of those
who created the Constitution, as well as to those who were responsible for the
Bill of Rights-let alone to our entire constitutional history and tradition." 23
According to the plurality, the Framers' failure to limit the treaty power to
those treaties made "in 'pursuance' of the Constitution" was only to leave in
place agreements made under the Articles of Confederation following the
Revolutionary War.124 Since Covert, the Court has implied that obligations
under international law are subject to constitutional restraints such as the First
118. HENKIN, supra note I 11, at 190.
119. Holland, 252 U.S. at 433.
120. A recent Supreme Court case, Golan v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 873 (2012), involved a
constitutional challenge that the Copyright Clause functions as an impediment to enacting a law
implementing a treaty. The Golan Court held that there was no constitutional violation of the Copyright
Clause and hence did not reach the issue. In another case recently remanded to the Third Circuit, the
Court held that an individual had standing to argue that a federal law enforcing a treaty violated the
Tenth Amendment. Bond v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2355 (2011). The Bond Court expressed no view
on the merits of the argument. Upon remand, the Third Circuit held that the subjects of implementing
legislation were not confined to those enumerated in Article 1, Section 8. United States v. Bond, 681
F.3d 149 (3d Cir. 2012). A petition for certiorari from that appeal is currently pending before the Court.
121. See Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz, Executing the Treaty Power, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1867,
1880 (2005).
122. Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 17 (1957) (holding that spouses of military workers are not
subject to unconstitutional trials despite a treaty between the United States and Great Britain that granted
military jurisdiction over such individuals to the United States).
123. Id. at 17.
124. Id. at 16-17.
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Amendment.125 As I explain below in Section IV.B., this precedent supports
the conclusion that the treaty power cannot be used to circumvent the
Origination Clause.
c. Statutes and Conflicting Treaties: The Last In Time Rule
Also relevant to our inquiry is the so-called last in time rule. Because the
Supremacy Clause ranks both treaties and statutes as the "supreme" laws of the
land, the Supreme Court has interpreted them to have equal standing. In the
case of a conflict between the two, the Court in Whitney v. Robertson adopted
the last in time rule, which famously holds that, as between treaties and
statutes, whichever was enacted most recently controls. 126 Accordingly, a later-
enacted statute overrides an earlier, conflicting treatyl27 and, conversely, a
later-ratified treaty supersedes an earlier, contrary statute.128 Because the last in
time rule has only domestic effect, when the former occurs, the United States
violates its international commitments. 129 Scholars have attacked the last in
time rule both for policy reasons and as contrary to the Framers' intent;130
however, others have answered these critiquesl31 and the Court has repeatedly
embraced it. 132
III. UNDERSTANDING TAX TREATIES
The prior discussion of the evolution and interpretation of the
Origination, Treaty, and Supremacy Clauses is necessary to appreciate these
clauses' effects in the realm of tax treaties. The below discussion provides a
brief overview of tax treaties and describes their status vis-d-vis domestic law.
125. In Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312 (1988), the Court held that a local law protecting foreign
diplomats by forbidding signs near embassies in accordance with treaty obligations is contrary to the
First Amendment. In dicta, the court stated that an interest under international law did not necessarily
render the interest compelling for purposes of First Amendment analysis. It, however, did not resolve the
issue since the local law was not narrowly tailored to serve any such interest, whether compelling or not.
See also Am. Ins. Ass'n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 416 (2003) (citing Boos, 485 U.S. at 324; Reid,
354 U.S. at 15-19) (stating in dicta that both treaties and executive agreements must comport with
individual rights as provided by the Constitution).
126. Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190, 194-95 (1888).
127. Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S. 371, 376 (1998) (denying relief to a defendant for a habeas
challenge under the Vienna Convention due to a later enacted law that procedurally barred such a
claim).
128. Cook v. United States, 288 U.S. 102, 118-19 (1933) (holding that a treaty between the
United States and Great Britain amended an extant statute authorizing inspections of foreign vessels).
129. For critiques of the last in time doctrine, see Kesavan, supra note 9; and Caleb Nelson,
Preemption, 86 VA. L. REV. 225, 254 (2000).
130. See Louis Henkin, Treaties in a Constitutional Democracy, 10 MICH. J. INT'L L. 406, 425-
26 (1989); Jules Lobel, The Limits of Constitutional Power: Conflicts Between Foreign Policy and
International Law, 71 VA. L. REV. 1071, 1099 (1985).
131. Peter Westen, The Place ofForeign Treaties in the Courts ofthe United States: A Reply to
Louis Henkin, 101 HARV. L. REV. 511, 512, 516 (1987) (justifying the last in time rule as a type of
political question doctrine).
132. Jordan J. Paust, Rediscovering the Relationship Between Congressional Power and
International Law: Exceptions to the Last in Time Rule and the Primacy of Custom, 28 VA. J. INT'L L.
393 (1988). Louis Henkin argued that the equality between treaties and domestic laws was not an
inevitable reading of the Supremacy Clause by the Court. To illustrate, Henkin states that "3 and 2 are
both 'supreme' to I but they are not equal." HENKIN,supra note 111, 210 n.*.
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A. Key Functions of Tax Treaties
The United States has entered into bilateral tax treaties for over three-
quarters of a century,133 with its first adopted in 1932.134 Tax treaties overlay
the domestic international tax rules of the United States, which consist of two
regimes: one governing the international activities of United States persons
abroad and one governing the activities of foreign persons in the United States.
Tax treaties are generally bilateral agreements whose stated purpose is to
alleviate the phenomenon of double taxation and to avoid fiscal evasion.
Double taxation occurs because taxation of international transactions differs
among nations. For instance, in the United States, Congress taxes the nation's
residents based on income they earn around the globe. This is called a
worldwide, or residence-based, system of taxation.136 Other countries will tax
any income that is sourced to that country through some nexus, such as taxing
interest income where funds are borrowed. For that reason, if a United States
resident earns interest on bonds from a Canadian corporation, both the United
States and Canada will tax that income-hence the term "double" taxation. Tax
treaties are a device nations use to resolve such conflicts.
Why is double taxation thought to be a problem? The treaty network is
intended to lower taxes in order to increase international trade and investment.
To this end, income-tax treaties typically limit taxing jurisdiction and cannot,
by their own terms, be used to increase a taxpayer's United States tax liability.
It would seem then that tax treaties generally serve to reduce United States
revenues, but this is not always the case. If the foreign tax of United States
taxpayers is reciprocally reduced or exempted by the tax treaty, the income is
still subject to United States tax but with a reduced or eliminated foreign tax
credit offset, reflecting the lower foreign tax paid as a result of the treaty. This
amounts to a larger United States tax liability. Thus, to the extent this effect
outweighs revenue lost by lower withholding rates on foreign persons, the
overall United States revenue might actually be increased as a result of the
entrance of the United States into a treaty. The net revenue effect is dependent
upon overall capital flows between the countries. 137
133. See, e.g., Michael J. Graetz, Taxing International Income: Inadequate Principles,
Outdated Concepts and Unsatisfactory Policies, 26 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 1357, 1357-62 (2001) (detailing
the history of tax treaties); Michael J. Graetz & Michael M. O'Hear, The "Original Intent" of U.S.
International Taxation, 46 DUKE L.J. 1021, 1066-89 (1997) (same).
134. Tax Convention, supra note 102.
135. United States Model Income Tax Convention, Nov. 15, 2006, http://www.treasury.gov
/press-center/press-releases/Documents/hpl6801.pdf (describing in the title and preamble the
convention's aims to avoid double taxation and prevent fiscal evasion). Although tax treaties have a
stated purpose to eliminate double taxation, modem welfare theory would deem the increase in
investment flows between countries as the relevant economic concern. I argue below that improvement
of the tax treaty process might clarify the purpose of tax treaties to reflect this and other important policy
goals. See infra notes 211-212 and accompanying text.
136. PAUL MCDANIEL ET AL., INTRODUCTION TO UNITED STATES INTERNATIONAL TAXATION
87 (5th ed. 2005).
137. See REUVEN S. AVI-YONAH, INTERNATIONAL TAX AS INTERNATIONAL LAw 170 (2007).
See generally MICHAEL J. GRAETZ, FOUNDATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL INCOME TAXATION (2003)
(discussing the international legal system for taxation).
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B. The Tax-Treaty-Making Process
The tax treaty-making process began in 1928 when the League of Nations
issued a draft model double-income tax treaty.' 38 Today, the more than three
thousand tax treaties around the world,'39 including the nearly seventy into
which the United States has entered,140 are based on the League of Nations
model, which in turn is the predecessor of both the United States model treaty
and the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD)
model treaty. 141 The basic structure of the United States' tax treaties remains
heavily influenced by these model treaties but important details do vary widely
across the various individual treaties and across time. They are indeed the
product of extensive negotiations among representatives of the United States,
generally officials from the Treasury Department's Office of International Tax
Counsel and the Office of Tax Analysis (Business and International Taxation),
and officials from the other country. Once a treaty has been negotiated, the text
is approved by the State Department and signed by executive officials, typically
the Secretary of State or the United States Ambassador in the United States.142
The treaty is then submitted to the Senate for advice and consent to
ratification. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee reviews the treaty and its
accompanying explanations prepared by the Treasury Department and the Joint
Committee on Taxation. After its review, the Committee sends the treaty to the
Senate floor. The full Senate debates the treaty, possibly with changes
recommended by the Committee, with consent rendered by a vote of two thirds
of the Senators present. After the Senate approves a resolution ratifying the
treaty, the President typically brings the treaty into force by exchanging signed
ratification instruments with the treaty partner.143
C. Tax Treaties as Self-Executing
Although a treaty may be ratified and in force, it may not necessarily have
legal effect. As discussed above,144 some treaties, by their own terms, require
implementing legislation. Previous commentators agree that tax treaties do not
require such legislation and are enforceable as soon as the treaties are
ratified,145 although they have not provided any in-depth analysis of the issue.
I 38. Report Presented by the General Meeting of Government Experts on Double Taxation and
Tax Evasion, League of Nations Doc. C.562M.178 1928 11 (1928).
139. Press Release, Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD),
OECD Model Tax Convention: 50 Years of Promoting a Business-Friendly Tax Environment. (Apr. 9,
2008), http://www.oecd.org/newsroom/oecdmodeltaxconvention50yearsofpromotingabusiness-friendlytax
environment.htm.
140. Christians, supra note 2, at 1419.
141. Graetz & O'Hear, supra note 133, at 1066; Victor Thuronyi, Tax Cooperation and a
Multilateral Tax Treaty, 26 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 1641, 1641 (2001).
142. ALLISON CHRISTIANS ET AL., UNITED STATES INTERNATIONAL TAXATION 184 (2d ed.
2011).
143. Id. at 184.
144. See supra notes 106-109.
145. Columbia Marine Servs., Inc. v. Reffet Ltd., 861 F.2d 18 (2d Cir. 1988) (assuming that a
tax treaty is self-executing); BORIS BITTKER & LAWRENCE LOKKEN, FEDERAL TAXATION OF INCOME,
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The text of bilateral tax treaties may render them self-executing even in light of
Medellin.146 This result would comport with current practice whereby
taxpayers claim the benefits provided by such treaties, with the blessing of both
Congress and the Treasury Department.147 We need not, however, decide the
issue with finality here since our inquiry is whether such legislation is
constitutionally mandated, regardless of treaty language.
Related to the question of whether tax treaties are self-executing is the
question of whether they have actually been implemented by legislation.
Although Congress does not implement individual income tax treaties through
legislation post-ratification, it could be argued that Section 894(a) of the Code,
which requires that "[t]he provisions of this title shall be applied to any
taxpayer with due regard to any treaty obligation of the United States which
applies to such taxpayer," 48 effectively achieves implementation of all tax
treaties.149 The extensive legislative history of this provision, however,
contains no reference that this was indeed its meaning; instead the history,
indicates that it was simply enacted as a codification of the last in time rule, and
it has been interpreted by commentators accordingly.150
ESTATES AND GIFTS T 65.4.1 (2012) ("Tax treaties are ratified by the Senate alone and are regarded as
self-executing, which means that they have the force of law even though not enacted as a statute.");
Michael P. Van Alstine, Federal Common Law in the Age of Treaties, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 892, 923
(2004); Wu, supra note 111, at 591 n.62 (detailing tax cases across four decades where the courts
"directly enforce[d] treaties without even discussing whether they [were] 'self-executing"').
146. See, e.g., UNITED STATES MODEL INCOME TAX CONVENTION art. 28 (2006) ("This
Convention shall enter into force on the date of the exchange of instruments of ratification, and its
provisions shall have effect."). To clarify the issue in light of Medellin, the Senate has recently begun to
attach declarations to its advice and consent that the tax treaty at issue is self-executing. See, e.g.,
S. TREATY Doc. No. 110-17 (2008) (consenting to the Tax Convention with Iceland subject to the
declaration that the Convention is self-executing).
147. Michael S. Kirsch, The Limits of Administrative Guidance in the Interpretation of Tax
Treaties, 87 TEX. L. REV. 1065, 1073-74 (2009).
148. 26 U.S.C. § 894(a) (2006).
149. For instance, John Yoo contests the "long pedigree of complete interchangeability" of
congressional-executive agreements and Article II treaties. John Yoo, Laws as Treaties? The
Constitutionality of Congressional-Executive Agreements, 99 MICH. L. REV. 757, 812 (2001). Instead,
he argues that the former addresses subjects traditionally within Congress's purview, such as
international trade, and that the latter are reserved to areas traditionally within Executive authority, such
as "national security, arms control, human rights, and the environment." Id. at 811. The observation that
tax treaties are uniformly enacted through the Article II process challenges this bifurcation since tax is
quintessentially within Congress's domain. Yoo recognizes tax treaties as a possible exception to his
thesis but attempts to argue that they have been implemented through Sections 894 and 7852(d) of the
Internal Revenue Code. Id. at 811 n.218.
150. CONFERENCE REPORT ON H.R. 4333 TECHNICAL AND MISCELLANEOUS REVIEw ACT OF
1988, H.R. REP. No. 100-1104, at 12 (1988) (Conf. Rep.). According to the legislative history, the "due
regard" language in Section 894(a) "simply provides for giving the treaty that regard which is due under
the ordinary rules of interpreting the interactions of statutes and treaties." Thus, "where a treaty
obligation has been superseded for internal U.S. law purposes, no effect need be given to the treaty
under the agreement provision." Id.; see BITTKER & LOKKEN, supra note 145, 1 65.4.1. This reading is
consistent with Section 894's cross-reference to Section 7852, which essentially codifies the last in time
rule. BITTKER & LOKKEN, supra note 145, 165.4.1. The final versions of Sections 894(a) and 7852 were
drafted as a compromise between the House's position that later enacted statutes would always trump
treaties, regardless of intent, and the IRS's position that a statute must explicitly override a treaty in
order for it to take precedence. See Irwin Halpern, United States Treaty Obligations, Revenue Laws, and
New Section 7852(d) of the Internal Revenue Code, 5 FLA. INT'L L.J. 1 (1989); see also Kathleen
Matthews, Treasury Encouraged by Finance Treaty Override Substitute, 40 TAX NOTES 662 (1988).
Relatedly, although the House could implement all treaties in existence, blanket implementation of all
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IV. SELF-EXECUTING TAX TREATIES AS CONSTITUTIONALLY SUSPECT
The above discussion makes evident the historical and practical
importance of both the Origination Clause and the Treaty Clause. This Section
argues that the interaction of those two clauses renders self-executing tax
treaties constitutionally suspect.
A. Tax Treaties Fall Within the Scope of the Origination Clause
1. Tax Treaties "Raise Revenue"
In order to assess the constitutional issues raised by self-executing tax
treaties, we must examine the scope of the Origination Clause to determine
whether tax treaties fall within its ambit. The Origination Clause has been
construed to encompass those classes of laws whose primary purpose (rather
than an incidental effect) is to raise money. Although tax treaties have a
stated purpose of mitigating double taxation and increasingly seem to also be
employed to increase investment flows between countries,152 these purposes do
not nullify their impact upon revenues.153
In other contexts, such as whether legislation is a tax within the meaning
of the Anti-Injunction Act, the Court has explicitly abandoned "distinctions
between regulatory and revenue-raising taxes."l 54 The Court's decision reflects
the reality that "[e]very tax is in some measure regulatory." 55 An opposite
conclusion would require the Court to examine hidden motivations for a tax.1 56
The recent health care decision reaffirms the Court's unwillingness to resurrect
future treaties may not absolve subsequent treaties from the constitutional requirement of
implementation. This would be akin to a waiver by the House of its origination power, in violation of the
case law thereunder. See United States v. Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. 385, 398 (1990).
151. See infra notes 154-162 and accompanying text.
152. See infra notes 208-209 and accompanying text.
153. Although my conclusion has implications for all treaties containing revenue-raising
provisions, the primary focus of this Article is upon modem bilateral income tax treaties. Generally, the
Supreme Court has held that legislation must have a primary purpose of raising revenue to fall within
the ambit of the Origination Clause. See infra notes 154-162 and accompanying text. Modern bilateral
income tax treaties fit squarely within this range of cases since their primary subject matter involves
revenue. It could be argued that some provisions therein, such as information exchange provisions, are
severable from the revenue portions of the treaty, although I think such a conclusion is overly
formalistic. See infra notes 309-314 and accompanying text. In the context of domestic legislation, the
line between revenue and non-revenue legislation can be blurry and this definitional difficulty would
continue in the treaty context. For instance, tax cuts bear a resemblance to spending provisions in that
both can deliver benefits to a favored group. Fees covering the cost of a government benefit may also
resemble taxes, although the House, in asserting its privilege under the Origination Clause, has
concerned itself primarily with fees deposited into the general fund rather than fees tied to the cost of
government services. SATURNO, supra note 46, at 5. Finally, it is important to note that trade treaties, a
conspicuous category of treaties potentially containing revenue-raising provisions, are generally enacted
as congressional-executive agreements rather than Article II treaties and thus do not violate the
Origination Clause.
154. Bob Jones Univ. v. Simon, 416 U.S. 725, 741 n.12 (1974).
155. Sozinsky v. United States, 300 U.S. 506, 513 (1937).
156. Id. at 513-14.
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the distinction between taxes and regulatory measures in establishing the
parameters of the taxing power. s7
An attempt to maintain a distinction between taxes that regulate conduct
and those that do not, applying the protection of the Origination Clause only to
the latter, would render the Clause a nullity. Perhaps for this reason, the Court
instead appears to focus on whether fees collected by the government are for
the general coffers of the government, in which case they are taxes subject to
the Clause, or whether they are to fund a single purpose, in which case they are
not. For instance, the Court has held that a bill taxing property in the District
of Columbia in order to provide the District with railroad terminals, was not a
bill to raise revenue within the meaning of the Clause.' 59 Similarly, the Court
rejected characterization of bank fees that would help establish a bond-backed
currency as taxes.160
Revenues affected by tax treaties do not fund a specific program or
purpose and instead fund the general "expenses or obligations of the
government." 16' Neither do they constitute quid pro quo arrangements of the
type identified by the lower courts as falling outside of the scope of the Clause.
In United States ex rel. Michels v. James, a New York district court held that a
bill to increase postage rates did not constitute a revenue bill because citizens
received postal service in exchange.162 The court reasoned that revenue bills
must either directly or indirectly impose taxes, or their equivalent, for the
government's use with no quid pro quo exchange.'6 The Origination Clause, it
argued, placed the power to originate taxes within the house most accountable
to the people out of concern that the government could exploit its citizens; a
voluntary payment for postal services does not fall within the category of the
Framers' concern.164 The encouragement of investment flows and tax
incentives provided by a treaty, although beneficial to certain taxpayers, does
not resemble a bargained-for transaction between the government and the
taxpayers. If pure economic benefits constituted a quid pro quo exchange, then
virtually all tax benefits would fall outside the scope of the Clause.
Tax treaties do "rais[e] revenue"1 65 in accordance with the language of
the Clause. Although one could read such words to encompass only legislation
that increases government revenue, as discussed above, appellate courts have
consistently rejected such an interpretation and instead have held that
legislation that relates to taxes falls within the scope of the Clause.' 66 Such a
157. See Nat'l Fed, of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, No. 11393, slip op. at 36-37, 42-43 (June 28,
2012).
158. See Kysar, supra note 22 (discussing this general pattern in the case law under the
Origination Clause).
159. Millard v. Roberts, 202 U.S. 429 (1906).
160. Twin City Bank v. Nebeker, 167 U.S. 196 (1897).
161. Id. at 203.
162. 26 F. Cas. 577, 578 (S.D.N.Y. 1875).
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 1.
166. See supra notes 45-53 and accompanying text.
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reading also comports with the reality that, "[at] the time the Constitution was
written, a tax bill in a generic sense and a tax bill that raised revenues above the
previous year's revenue were tautologous."1 67 If we are to conclude that the
original meaning of the Clause was to protect all tax bills, then the existence of
only revenue-increasing bills at the founding should not limit the Clause's
scope to such bills. The democratic concerns motivating the Clause, after all,
apply equally to revenue-decreasing bills since our revenue system is
essentially a zero sum game; accordingly, even certain tax cuts may harm the
public.
It could, however, be argued that the Court has expressed a willingness to
examine whether revenues were increased. In Munoz-Flores, the Court held
that a law imposing a monetary assessment on criminals to compensate victims
of crime did not constitute a tax. The Court reasoned that although the
legislation at issue specified that assessments exceeding a certain amount
would be deposited into the general Treasury, in fact no excess revenues
occurred. The Court's inquiry into the amount of revenues collected,
however, was relevant only tangentially to the question of whether they funded
a specific program or the general Treasury. Where that concern does not exist,
the amount of revenues collected should be irrelevant, in accordance with the
Clause's meaning.
The appellate courts correctly reasoned that interpreting the clause to
require only a relation to revenues, regardless of direction, comports with
dictionary definitions and Congressional precedent. 170 A contrary interpretation
would drastically reduce the Senate's amendment power since the Senate
would be forbidden from proposing amendments that would turn tax cuts into
tax increases. 171 It would also be practically impossible to adopt due to the
inability to predict the precise revenue impact of the law. This is the case for
tax treaties as well, which have the potential to increase or decrease revenues
depending on the directional flows of investment.172 This constitutional
analysis admittedly overturns a widespread view among practitioners and the
Internal Revenue Service that tax treaties must not increase tax liability in order
to avoid violation of the Origination Clause. 1 Nevertheless, it comports with
the case law and is necessary in light of the difficulties implementing an
opposite approach.
167. John L. Hoffer, The Origination Clause and Tax Legislation, 2 B.U. J. TAX L. 1, 5 (1984).
168. United States v. Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. 385, 398 (1990).
169. Id. at 399.
170. Armstrong v. United States, 759 F.2d 1378, 1381 (9th Cir. 1985) (citing BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 1133 (rev. 5th ed. 1979)).
171. Id.
172. See supra Section IlIl.A; see also Wardell v. United States, 757 F.2d 203, 205 (8th Cir.
1985); Armstrong, 759 F.2d at 1381 ("The term 'Bills for raising Revenue' does not refer only to laws
increasing taxes, but instead refers in general to all laws relating to taxes."); 2 HINDS' PRECEDENTS,
supra note 58, at 949-53.
173. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 1; see supra note 6 and accompanying text.
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2. Tax Treaties as "Bill" Substitutes
A more difficult textual question arises in considering whether a treaty is
a "bill[] for raising Revenue."l 74 There is no discussion in the historical records
indicating a definition of this term.175 Today, we think of a bill as a draft
statute, before it becomes law. This definition could fairly encompass a treaty
since such an instrument is given legal status under the Supremacy Clause and
under international law. Although not a draft statute, it is a draft law. Indeed,
one court has stated that "all laws relating to taxes" fall within the scope of the
Origination Clause and that tax treaties constitute such laws. 176
The Founders did, however, distinguish between laws and bills in the text
of the Constitution. For instance, Article I, Section 9 provides that "no money
shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in Consequence of Appropriations made
by Law." Thus, one could argue that the appropriations power necessarily
limits the treaty power since treaties are laws; the same cannot be said for the
origination power, which only applies to bills. Yet such an interpretation misses
the context of the origination power, which, by definition, only applies to laws
in draft form. A "bill" is, after all, shorthand for a draft law. Thus, we cannot
read much into the choice of phrasing the Origination Clause as applying to
bills, as opposed to the Appropriations Clause's reference to laws. Rather than
indicating intent that the Appropriations Clause limits the treaty power in a way
that the Origination Clause did not, it is more likely that the Framers only
wished to conveniently convey that the origination power necessarily applied to
laws in draft form.
Such a reading comports with the sensible view that enacting law through
other means should not be an end-run around the exclusive requirements for
creating revenue-raising legislation. This interpretation roots itself in case law
striking down actions that avoid the precise constitutional procedures for
enacting law. For instance, in INS v. Chadha, the Court struck down Congress's
ability to effectively amend legislation outside of the Article I, Section 7
procedures. 177 The Chadha Court held that a one-house legislative veto
violated the requirements of bicameralism and presentment. The case involved
an immigration statute authorizing the INS to suspend deportation in cases of
extreme hardship, a finding that could be vetoed by either house of Congress.
In effect, the Court held that, although Congress's action did not constitute a
bill, per se, its intention was to enact law outside of the "'finely wrought'
procedure that the Framers designed" through which bills became laws.178
174. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. I (emphasis added).
175. J. Gregory Sidak & Thomas A. Smith, Four Faces of the Item Veto: A Reply to Tribe and
Kurland, 84 Nw. U. L. REv. 437, 469 (1990) ("Neither the Constitution, the debates from the
Constitutional Convention, nor The Federalist define 'bill' . . .
176. Armstrong, 759 F.2d at 138.
177. INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
178. Id. at 951. To be sure, the Chadha Court listed the treaty power as one of four provisions
"by which one House may act alone with the unreviewable force of law." Id. at 955. Chadha's
usefulness is hence limited to the inquiry of whether or not self-executing tax treaties should be
considered impermissible substitutes for bills, for purposes of the Origination Clause; not whether all
treaties are subject to Article I, Section 7 procedures. Because there is little historical evidence as to
272013]
28 THE YALE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 38: 1
Similarly, the Origination Clause designates the exclusive procedures through
which an instrument, even if not a "bill," has to progress.179
Indeed, the Framers took precautions to protect against evasion of the
strict requirements of Article I, Section 7, Clause 2. During the final debate on
that clause, James Madison expressed concern that congressional members
might simply call a proposed law a "resolution," "order," or "vote" rather than
a "bill," thus circumventing the Presentment Clause.180  Clause 3 was
subsequently added as a corollary to Clause 2 to address this concern.18 1
Although similar protections were not put in place for tax treaties, the existence
of which was not yet contemplated, one might take from this account a general
intent that subsequent lawmakers not bypass the procedural limitations of
Article I through nonbill vehicles.182
Following this reasoning, even if tax treaties do not directly fall under the
scope of the Origination Clause, they should not serve as an end-run around it
without causing grave constitutional concerns. International tax agreements
what constitutes a "bill," the principle of Chadha can serve as a gap-filling precedent that enhances our
understanding of that term. In light of the special considerations given to revenue legislation, as
evidenced by the Origination Clause and its history, we should construe the Origination Clause to
encompass those laws, such as tax treaties, that serve to circumscribe it.
179. This adherence to process is illustrated further in Clinton v. City of New York, where the
Court struck down the President's ability to effectively amend legislation outside of the Article I,Section 7 procedures. 524 U.S. 417 (1998). At issue in City ofNew York was the Line Item Veto Act of
1996 (LIVA), whereby the President was granted the ability to cancel, after signing legislation into law,(i) discretionary budget authority; (ii) new direct spending; or (iii) limited tax benefits. Pub. L. No. 104-
130, § 2, 110 Stat. 1200, 1200 (1996). Congress could subsequently nullify any such cancellation by
enacting a disapproval bill and overriding a veto of any such bill. The Supreme Court held that LIVA
violated the Presentment Clause of the U.S. Constitution because it effectively allowed the President to
amend or repeal statutes-a legislative function-without following the constitutional requirement of
bicameralism. Clinton, 534 U.S. at 445-46.
180. 2 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 25, at 301.
181. Id. at 304-05. Article I, Section 7, Clause 3 provides:
Every order, resolution, or vote to which the concurrence of the Senate and House of
Representatives may be necessary (except on a question of adjournment) shall be
presented to the President of the United States; and before the same shall take effect, shall
be approved by him, or being disapproved by him, shall be repassed by two thirds of the
Senate and House of Representatives, according to the rules and limitations prescribed in
the case of a bill.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 3.
182. One could potentially construe this argument to encompass administrative guidance, such
as treasury regulations. Because such guidance does not originate in the House, so the argument would
go, it violates the Origination Clause. Unlike tax treaties, however, administrative guidance exists under
general or specific delegations from the House. Interpretive regulations, for instance, are issued under
the authority delegated from 26 U.S.C. § 7805(a). Legislative regulations are authorized by specific
Internal Revenue Code provisions. The House's involvement in this manner reduces or eliminates
constitutional concerns regarding treasury regulations. See also Skinner v. Mid-Am. Pipeline Co., 490
U.S. 212, 220-23 (1989) (rejecting the contention that the Origination Clause limits congressional
authority to delegate its taxing power to the executive branch). Additionally, unlike tax treaties, both
types of regulations are subject to challenge if they deviate from congressional intent regarding the
interpretation of the Code or do not fall within these delegations. The House can also initiate legislation
overriding regulations. Although the House has this option in the tax-treaty context as well, doing so
violates international law. The House's omission in the tax-treaty context is accordingly of much greater
concern. One could further argue, however, that the House's silence in the tax-treaty context could be
interpreted as acquiescence to the model treaty, which is akin to delegation. For reasons explored in the
text, I find it difficult to accept Congress's silence as acquiescence and instead interpret it as a product
largely of historical happenstance and standing issues. See infra notes 285-294 and accompanying text.
The author thanks Gillian Metzger and Michael Graetz for raising these issues.
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should instead, as the thesis of this Article advances, consist of (a) tax treaties
implemented with legislation or (b) congressional-executive agreements. This
reading recognizes the constitutionally mandated special and exclusive means
through which revenue-raising laws must pass.
B. The Origination Clause as a Constitutional Limit on the Treaty
Power
The treaty power is bound by certain constitutional limits, one of which is
the Origination Clause.183 The best reading of the case law in this areal84 is that
Congress may not invoke the treaty power to transgress an express
constitutional prohibition that applies to the federal government. As discussed
below, application of this principle to the matter at hand leads to the conclusion
that the Origination Clause indeed limits the treaty power, despite Missouri v.
Holland's holding that the Tenth Amendment does not act as such a limit.
The Reid v. Covert Court distinguished Missouri v. Holland by
concluding that the treaty at issue in Holland violated no express prohibitions
otherwise found in the Constitution and thus differed from the executive
agreement in Reid, which violated the Sixth Amendment.185 By requiring that
revenue laws be made within the Article I, Section 7 apparatus, the Origination
Clause is an express prohibition akin to the Sixth Amendment. Both
constitutional provisions limit the actions of the federal government as a whole.
By contrast, Article I, Section 8's enumeration of powers (at issue in Missouri
v. Holland), by its own terms, curtails only the powers of the legislative branch
and not those of the federal government. In other words, Article I, Section 8
enumerates the limited areas in which Congress can legislate but does not
foreclose the sharing of those powers with the rest of the federal government.
In contrast, the Origination Clause prescribes precise and exclusive procedures
through which revenue bills are to become law, necessarily applying to the
federal government as a whole.
Moreover, the larger context of the Commerce Clause jurisprudence
within which Missouri v. Holland resides casts doubt upon the case's
constitutional significance. The environmental concerns of the Migratory Bird
Act at issue in the case constitute matters of interstate and transnational
importance. Under the modern Commerce Clause jurisprudence that developed
within a few decades of the decision, Congress would no longer need an
183. See supra notes 119-125 and accompanying text; see also Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 17-
18 (1985) ("The prohibitions of the Constitution were designed to apply to all branches of the National
Government, including the Congress, the Executive ... [and] the Executive and the Senate combined.").
184. See supra notes 117-125 and accompanying text (discussing Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S.
416 (1920); Reid, 354 U.S. at 1). The Missouri Court held that a non-self-executing treaty can bestow
upon Congress power prohibited by the Constitution while the Reid Court held that international
agreements cannot authorize Congress to violate the Sixth Amendment. Although Reid produced a
plurality opinion in which "the point was squarely made only in the opinion of Justice Black . .. the
proposition seems inherent in the concurring opinions of [two justices]" and none of the justices took
exception to Black's conclusion. Sedgwick W. Green, The Treaty Making Power and the
Extraterritorial Effect of the Constitution: Reid v. Covert and the Girard Case, 42 MINN. L. REV. 825,
825 (1957).
185. Reid, 354 U.S. at 18.
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expansive treaty power to regulate migratory birds but could instead rely upon
the Court's robust interpretation of the Commerce Clause.186 Even at the time
of the decision, case law under the Commerce Clause, which upheld federal
statutes regulating lottery ticket sales and the interstate transport of women for
"immoral purposes," could have been used by the Court to uphold the
Migratory Bird Act.' 87
Leaving aside the question of whether Missouri v. Holland was correctly
decided under such case law, the subsequent case law establishing broad
powers under the Commerce Clause has dramatically reduced the importance
of the decision, even in light of more recent decisions that have somewhat
reversed that trend. 188 Historical practice also supports a diminished view of
Missouri v. Holland. Treatymakers have failed to seize upon the powers
imparted by the decision to enact laws beyond the scope of congressional
authority.189 In fact, since the case was decided, not a single treaty depends on
the decision for its constitutionality.190 If one considers historical practice in
establishing constitutional norms, 191 "the decision is no longer good law if it
ever was."192
Others contend that the failure of the Bricker Amendment, which would
have overruled Missouri v. Holland by limiting the treaty power to the
enumerated powers in Section 8, indicates that the case is still good law.1 93 An
186. Judith Resnik, The Internationalism of American Federalism: Missouri and Holland, 73
Mo. L. REv. 1105,1116-17 (2008).
187. Id. at 1116.
188. See, e.g., Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, No. 11-393 (June 28, 2012) (upholding
the individual mandate portion of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act as within Congress's
taxing powers but refusing to uphold the mandate under the Commerce Clause); United States v.
Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000) (striking down a provision that authorized damage actions against
gender-based crime); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995) (holding that a law making it a
federal crime to possess a firearm within a school zone was not a valid exercise of Congress's power
under the Commerce Clause).
189. Peter J. Spiro, Resurrecting Missouri v. Holland, 73 Mo. L. REv. 1029, 1029 (2008).
190. Id.
191. See Peter J. Spiro, Treaties, Executive Agreements, and Constitutional Method, 79 TEX. L.
REV. 961, 1001-16 (2001) (using historical practice to determine constitutional norms). The failure of the
federal government to utilize its powers under Holland stands in contrast to the failure of the House to
assert its privileges under the Origination Clause in the context of tax treaties. The former situation does
not involve heavy agenda constraints and other procedural obstacles that could explain the failure to act.
Moreover, the House's willingness to instigate tax treaty overrides indicates that its failure to insist upon
participation in the treaty process perhaps represents impotence, explained by historical happenstance
and the difficulty of establishing congressional standing, rather than acquiescence. See infra notes 283-
294 and accompanying text.
192. Spiro, supra note 189, at 1029.
193. Daniel M. Golove, Treaty-Making and the Nation: The Historical Foundations of the
Nationalist Conception of the Treaty Power, 98 MICH. L. REv. 1075, 1273-78 (2000) ("[T]he Bricker
Amendment controversy actually revealed far greater consensus on the nationalist view than may at first
have appeared, and the controversy ultimately enhanced its constitutional grounding."). Several scholars
have argued that Missouri v. Holland should be overruled. Nicholas Rosenkranz, for instance, argues
that Missouri v. Holland wrongly approves of implementing legislation involving subjects outside of the
enumerated powers of Section 8, in conflict with constitutional text, history, and structure. Rosenkranz
argues that the Necessary and Proper Clause does not grant Congress the power to make treaties but
instead grants Congress only the power to make laws that are necessary to execute the treaty power,
such as appropriations. Under this view, the Court erred in expanding Congress's powers beyond those
enumerated in Section 8. Rosenkranz, supra note 121, at 1868, 1183. Rosenkranz also dismisses as
historically inaccurate the argument made by Louis Henkin and relied upon by subsequent courts that
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alternative account of this episode, however, sustains the view that Missouri v.
Holland remains largely symbolic. Senator Bricker, who spearheaded the
campaign for the amendment, conceded that the "executive branch acts as
though the Holland case had never been decided." 94 In retrospect, it appears
that the amendment was unnecessary, since this sentiment continues to be
true. 195 Admittedly, expansion of global activity could resurrect the need for
treaty makers to utilize Missouri v. Holland in the future,196 yet the long
dormancy of the decision, coupled with the narrowness of the holding in light
of modem case law, cast doubt upon its continued precedential value.197
Missouri v. Holland involved the issue of whether non-self-executing
treaties and subsequent implementing legislation can address subjects outside
of Congress's enumerated powers. Another closely related question is whether
self-executing treaties can address subjects within Congress's enumerated
powers. Some commentators have argued that treaties addressing subjects in
Section 8 are not self-executing. 198 It is far from clear, however, whether
Article I, Section 8 can fairly be read as bestowing powers upon the legislature
and the legislature alone. Indeed, many of the enumerated powers, such as the
power to regulate foreign commerce, involved subjects that, at the time of the
Founding, were dealt with by treaties. 199 Article I, Section 8 therefore stands in
contrast to the Origination Clause, which bestows upon the House the exclusive
power to originate revenue law.
C. Normative Justifications for Involvement of the House
Historical evidence, as well as constitutional and doctrinal analysis,
weighs in favor of subjecting tax treaties to the demands of the Origination
Clause. Normative considerations tip the balance even more heavily in favor of
privileging the Origination Clause over the Treaty Clause to require that
"'[tihe [Necessary and Proper C]lause originally contained expressly the power to enforce treaties
but ... was stricken as superfluous."' Id. at 1912 (emphasis omitted) (quoting HENKIN, supra note I11,
at 481 n.1 11); see also Curtis A. Bradley, The Treaty Power and American Federalism, Part II, 99
MICH. L. REv. 98, 100 (2000) (arguing that treaty makers have the power to conclude treaties on matters
beyond Congress's enumerated powers, but such treaties could not be self-executing, and Congress
could not implement them); Carlos Manuel Vasquez, Missouri v. Holland's Second Holding, 73 Mo. L.
REv. 939, 941 (2008) (arguing that Congress lacks the power to implement aspirational treaties
addressing subjects beyond its enumerated powers).
194. John W. Bricker, Constitutional Insurance for a Safe Treaty-Making Policy, 60 DICK. L.
REv. 103,115 (1956).
195. Spiro, supra note 189, at 1029.
196. Id. Even if the treaty power were used in this manner, it is conceivable that, given the
Court's recent federalism jurisprudence, such treaties would be struck down. See Thomas Healy, Is
Missouri v. Holland Still Good Law? Federalism and the Treaty Power, 98 COLUM. L. REv. 1726
(1998).
197. In light of these developments, Judith Resnik understands the significance of Missouri v.
Holland to be less about "dramatic and implicitly preclusive federal authority" and more about "the
potential for overlapping federal and state action." Resnik, supra note 186, at 1117-18.
198. See, e.g., Yoo, Globalism, supra note 9; Yoo, Treaties and Public Lawmaking, supra note
9, at 2255; see also HENKIN, supra note I11, at 203 (suggesting non-self-execution for treaties involving
appropriations, crime, and war). But see HENKIN, supra note 111, at 115 (arguing that Congress is not
free to refuse to appropriate funds to implement treaties).
199. Jordan J. Paust, Self-Executing Treaties, 82 AM. J. INT'L L. 760, 779 (1988).
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international tax agreements involve the House. The Origination Clause
bestows considerable democratic and political economy advantages while also
creating more reliable international commitments. The motivations behind the
Treaty Clause, on the other hand, have largely fallen away in modem times.
1. Democratic Legitimacy and Enhanced Deliberation
Including the House in the international tax agreement process would
result in international tax policy with enhanced democratic legitimacy.
Although this argument could be made to justify inclusion of the House in all
treaties, it resonates particularly strongly in the revenue context. The Founders
chose the House to act first on revenue matters precisely due to its more
democratic features. Through frequent elections of its representatives and a
population-based membership, the House is closer to the sentiments of the
populace.
Tax treaties necessarily affect not only the revenue collected upon foreign
persons, but also upon domestic persons. In many senses, our tax system
functions as a zero-sum game, and to reduce the taxes of foreign persons will,
at times, increase the taxes of domestic persons, to make up for the foregone
revenue. Tax treaties also work on a reciprocal basis such that a foreign
jurisdiction's taxation of United States persons will be reduced. Due to our
system of worldwide taxation, the United States taxes on a residual basis and
benefits when its citizens and residents pay lower foreign taxes, thus
implicating the nation's overall revenue picture 2 00 The exclusion of the House
from the making of tax treaties is especially troubling in the modern era, where
international and domestic tax policies are inevitably entwined. The proper
domestic corporate-tax rate, for instance, is very much related to the tax
benefits multinationals receive abroad under reciprocal agreements. These
dynamics, by altering the tax bills of United States citizens and residents and
the revenues collected by the United States, implicates the primary concern of
the Origination Clause-that those farthest removed from the people have the
ability to set the nation's taxing agenda. The current treaty process also
problematically permits the Executive to intentionally circumvent the House to
enact otherwise unfavorable policies,201 a result which is especially noxious in
the revenue context given the House's special constitutional role.
Other democratic benefits flow from the remedies' utilization of the
legislative process and the enhanced deliberation that follows. Article II treaties
200. This is due to the fact that reduced foreign taxes create a lower foreign tax credit. The
foreign tax credit offsets the United States tax liability of United States citizens and residents. See 26
U.S.C. § 901 (2006).
201. An example of this phenomenon occurs in the International Monetary Fund context.
Governments use pressure from that entity to secure policies unpopular on the domestic front. Robert D.
Putnam, Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games, 42 INT'L ORG. 427, 457
(1988). In the trade context, the executive branch has pursued treaties when it failed to secure the
support of Congress to lift licensing restrictions on arms exports. See Duncan Hollis, A Head-Spinning
Self-Execution Story, OPIN1o JURIS (Nov. 11, 2010, 1:56 AM), http://opiniojuris.org/2010/1 1/lIl/a-head
-spinning-self-execution-story.
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evade various budget rules to deliver tax benefits without ever accounting for
their costs. 202 Despite the complex, varied, and dynamic economic effects of
tax treaties, the executive branch does not present economic analyses of tax
treaties, 2 03 nor does the Joint Committee on Taxation publish revenue effects of
tax treaties. The lack of economic consensus on whether tax treaties positively
impact foreign direct investment204 and the inability to generalize whether a tax
treaty will negatively or positively affect United States revenues205 makes these
omissions glaring. Tax treaties' circumvention of the budget process altogether
is troubling, especially in light of our fiscal crisis and congressional tendency to
over-spend through the tax code. Processing tax treaties through legislation
would have the additional benefit of creating transparency on their revenue
effects because they then would be subject to the rigors of the budget process.
The use of legislation would allow congressional members to see the real
budgetary costs of treaty benefits and to judge them accordingly.
Indeed, the very process by which tax treaties would be implemented or
approved through legislation may be seen as beneficial to democracy since it
allows increased opportunities for deliberation. Deliberation over tax treaties is
decidedly lacking, which is problematic given their impact on taxpayers.
Although an elite group of taxpayers benefits from tax treaties, those benefits
come at a cost to the general public. It is concerning, then, that groups like
labor unions, who are very active in the debate over the reach of our
international tax system as implemented through domestic law, are silent when
the United States negotiates tax treaties, even though such treaties involve
many of the same issues.206 Indeed, domestic policy disfavoring outbound
investment conflicts with the tax treaty practice of lower withholding rates, and
yet robust debate focuses on only the former. These advocacy groups overlook
tax treaties not because they are disinterested but because the tax treaty process
excludes open and robust deliberation. Treaties are negotiated in closed
meetings with Treasury and State officials and approved without fanfare by
only one part of Congress. 207
Enhanced deliberation might also clarify the objectives of tax treaties.
Although current explanations of tax treaties are framed in terms of the
avoidance of double taxation, modern welfare analysis supports increasing
cross-border investment rather than preventing "the supposed evils of double
taxation," 208 goals which are not necessarily compatible with one another.
202. Steven Dean, The Tax Expenditure Budget Is a Zombie Accountant, 46 U.C. DAVIS L.
REv. 265, 306-07 (2012).
203. See Patrick Driessen, Is There a Tax Treaty Insularity Complex?, 135 TAX NOTES 745, 746
(2012).
204. See KARL P. SAUVANT & LISA E. SACHS, THE EFFECT OF TREATIES ON FOREIGN DIRECT
INVESTMENT: BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES, DOUBLE TAXATION TREATIES, AND INVESTMENT
FLOWS 660 (2009).
205. See supra note 137 and accompanying text.
206. See Driessen, supra note 203, at751.
207. Id. at 745-46.
208. Daniel Shaviro, The Case Against Foreign Tax Credits, 3 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 65, 68-69
(2011). After all, double taxation does not necessarily constitute over-taxation, nor does the concept
automatically address concerns of under-taxation. See Driessen, supra note 203, at 745, 748 n.18.
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Indeed, recent treaties seem to focus on the former objective, despite not having
this reflected in the explanation of the purpose or the discussion of the treaty. 209
Other possible treaty purposes such as maximizing national welfare, increasing
revenue effects, and the prevention of tax evasion are similarly ignored or
minimized in the treaty documents and deliberation. 210 Although some or all of
these aspirations might justify the existence and form of modem tax treaties,
fuller vetting of this empirical question is necessary. Implementing or approval
legislation would further such an endeavor, improving the content of tax
treaties as a result.
2. Political Economy Benefits
A more democratic treaty process also serves an important political
economy benefit by combating tendencies in our tax system to oversupply
benefits to concentrated special interests to the detriment of the disorganized
and disinterested public. 2 11 Public choice scholars model the legislative process
as a marketplace and predict that supply and demand patterns shift for different
categories of policy issues according to willingness and ability to pay for legal
212
rules. Interest groups, as smaller entities, can easily organize with few
transaction costs, to obtain benefits at the expense of the public. Meanwhile,
these expenses are distributed across the general taxpaying public and are
diffuse. Because each taxpayer bears only a miniscule part of the burden of
supplying interest group legislation, we see more private-regarding and less
public-regarding legislation in the tax area. 213
Self-executing tax treaties deliver benefits to special interests with little
214deliberation and while evading congressional budgetary rules. Implementing
or approval legislation will likely increase the transparency of such previously
off-budget items, adding to their costs. The need for coordination with the
House also makes such interest group deals more costly. The bicameral aspect
of my proposal serves to reduce special interest deals since the constituent
bases of the two houses differ substantially.215 This theory is bolstered by the
209. Driessen, supra note 203, at 748. Aside from a lack of coherence within and between
treaties, misstated purposes also present the danger of misleading the judiciary who is charged with
interpreting the treaty.
210. Id. at747-49.
211. WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, PHILIP P. FRICKEY & ELIZABETH GARRETT, CASES AND
MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION: STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY 59 (4th ed. 2007).
212. See Gary S. Becker, A Theory of Competition Among Pressure Groups for Political
Influence, 98 Q.J. ECON. 371, 371, 373-74 (1983); Jonathan R. Macey, Competing Economic Views of
the Constitution, 56 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 50, 62-63 (1987).
213. On the distinction between private- and public-regarding legislation, see JAMES M.
BUCHANAN & GORDON TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT (1962); ANTHONY DOWNS, AN
ECONOMIC THEORY OF DEMOCRACY 260-76 (1957); MICHAEL T. HAYES, LOBBYISTS AND
LEGISLATORS: A THEORY OF POLITICAL MARKETS (1981); DENNIS C. MUELLER, 2 PUBLIC CHOICE 205-
06 (1989); MANCUR OLSON, JR., THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION 53-57 (1965); and JAMES Q.
WILSON, POLITICAL ORGANIZATIONS (1973).
214. See Dean, supra note 202, at 306-07.
215. See William F. Shughart II & Robert D. Tollison, On the Growth of Government and the
Political Economy ofLegislation, in 9 RESEARCH IN LAW AND ECONOMICS 111, 121 (Richard 0. Zerbe,
Jr. ed., 1986).
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finding that as the difference in size between the House and the Senate became
more pronounced, the output of laws decreased,216 which, in turn, can be
explained by the greater costs necessary to secure a majority in both Houses.217
Bicameralism has the potential to mute the influence of special interests by
making their preferences more difficult to enact. Because tax treaties dole out
benefits, they are generally promoted by special interests and not opposed by
them.218 As a result, bicameralism will screen out treaty provisions favoring
special interests without also reducing benefits to the general public.219
By increasing the costs of enactment, legislation that implements or
approves tax treaties may thus help combat the problem of the over-supply of
interest group benefits. This valuable political economy function supports the
216. See id. at 120-25.
217. See Robert D. Tollison, Public Choice and Legislation, 74 VA. L. REV. 339, 366 (1988).
Bicameralism may, however, serve to increase the duration of legislation, hence creating more valuable
interest group deals. See William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Independent Judiciaty in an
Interest-Group Perspective, 18 J.L. & ECON. 875, 877-79 (1975).
218. An example of a tax treaty provision benefitting special interests is, for instance, the
"equipment fee clauses" in the treaties with India, Indonesia, and Tunisia that exempt payments for the
use of ships, aircrafts, and containers from any potential withholding tax. See Tax Convention, U.S.-
Tunis., art. 12(3)(d), Oct. 4, 1989, S. TREATY Doc. No. 99-13 (1989); Tax Convention, U.S.-India, art.
12(3)(b), Sept. 12, 1989, S. TREATY Doc. No. 101-5 (1989); Tax Convention, U.S.-Indon., art. 12(3)(b),
July 11, 1988, S. TREATY. Doc. No. 100-22 (1988); Tax Convention, U.S.-Austria, art. VIII(l), Oct. 25,
1956, T.I.A.S. No. 3923 (1956).
219. One might further argue that the shorter terms of House members guard against special
interest deals for the following reason. Because interest groups have few ways to enforce legislative
deals, other mechanisms, such as legislative committees and the independent judiciary, have arisen to
increase the durability of legislation in order to accommodate interest-group politics. See Landes &
Posner, supra note 217, at 877-78; see also W. Mark Crain & Robert D. Tollison, The Executive Branch
in the Interest-Group Theory of Government, 8 J. LEGAL STUD. 555 (1979) (describing the executive
veto as an instrument to increase legislative durability); Richard L. Doemberg & Fred S. McChesney,
On the Accelerating Rate and Decreasing Durability of Tax Reform, 71 MINN. L. REV. 913, 945-53
(1986) (discussing another strategy in coping with the unenforceability of legislative deals in which
interest groups and lawmakers decrease the duration of such deals, a phenomenon particularly prevalent
in the tax context); Rebecca M. Kysar, Lasting Legislation, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 1007, 1051-56 (2011)
(noting that although longer deals are more efficient for all parties, some features of the legislative
process, such as campaign finance limitations, have made their achievement more difficult in recent
decades). Greater legislative turnover reduces the stability of such deals since it can lead to legislative
amendments or repeals of such benefits. See Todd J. Zywicki, Senators and Special Interests: A Public
Choice Analysis of the Seventeenth Amendment, 73 OR. L. REV. 1007, 1028-29 (1994). It follows that
legislators with longer tenure are better able to provide benefits to interest groups because their
legislative deals are more durable. Longer terms among legislators will also reduce transaction costs
such that logrolling is made easier, thereby further increasing interest group deal-making. See Tollison,
supra note 217, at 344-45; Zywicki, supra, at 1029. With the inclusion in the treaty process of the
House, comprised of representatives whose short terms prevent them from providing equally generous
legislative benefits, the more generous Senate may be stymied in doling out interest group legislation.
Nevertheless, other differences between the houses make it difficult to conclude with any certainty
which one produces more interest group legislation. For instance, the Senate's larger, more diversified
constituencies may make it more difficult for it to provide interest group benefits. See Josh Chafetz,
Multiplicity in Federalism and the Separation ofPowers, 120 YALE L.J. 1084, 1123 (2011) (reviewing
ALISON L. LACROiX, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF AMERICAN FEDERALISM (2010)). Certain
committees might also be in better positions to reward interest groups. See Kevin Grier & Michael
Munger, Comparing Interest Group PAC Contributions to House and Senate Incumbents, 1980-1986,
55 J. POL. 615, 618 (1993) (revealing that interest groups spend substantial time and money to influence
the Rules Committee of the House). Finally, despite the Senate's longer terms, members of the House
tend to have longer tenure than senators, perhaps making them more susceptible to interest group
pressure. See Frank H. Easterbrook, The State of Madison's Vision of a State: A Public Choice
Perspective, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1328, 1334 (1994) (positing that gerrymandering explains the longer
tenure of representatives).
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democratic rationales underlying the Origination Clause. Although tax treaties
benefit the very few, their costs impact the general public and hence implicate
the concerns of the Framers. Along with enhanced transparency, the vetogates
imposed by the prescribed remedies would subject those costs to closer
scrutiny.
3. Increased Durability ofInternational Commitments
These heightened procedures, although more democratically legitimate
and constitutionally coherent, may come at a cost. One practical concern that
might be raised is that the requirement of implementing or approval legislation
may result in fewer tax treaties or more protracted negotiations.220 Although it
is impossible to conclude that the Article II process will produce more
international agreements than the congressional-executive agreement
process,221 either implementing legislation or congressional-executive
agreements would create more reliable international tax commitments than the
current Article II apparatus. The United States' enhanced reputational
credibility gained by such increased stability would mitigate any reduction in
the number of tax treaties that the additional complexity of the process would
produce.222
First, the involvement of the House in the treaty process may stave off
any later temptation for the House to initiate tax treaty overrides. Because of
the equivalence of laws and treaties under the Supremacy Clause and the last in
time rule, the United States can and does unilaterally override its treaty
220. Although the House would not participate in the negotiation stage under my proposal, such
negotiations will naturally take into consideration the position of the House on relevant issues.
221. In some circumstances, however, congressional-executive agreements may be easier to
enact than Article II treaties. After all, the two-thirds requirement of the Treaty Clause exceeds the
simple majority vote required to pass a congressional-executive agreement. At least partially due to the
high voting requirement of the Treaty Clause, nearly fifty treaties remain pending before the Senate,
with the oldest dating back to 1949. Hathaway, supra note 8, at 1313-14. Although congressional-
executive agreements may be subject to a filibuster, such an act entails political costs and can be
overcome by a lower sixty-vote supermajority on cloture. Additionally, some congressional-executive
agreements follow a fast track process that waives the possibility of a filibuster. See, e.g., Trade Act of
1974 § 151, Pub. L. No. 93-617, 88 Stat. 1978, 2001 (1975) (codified at 19 U.S.C. § 2191 (2006))
(expired 2007). Also, Article II treaties proceed through the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, while
congressional-executive agreements move through the relevant subject matter committees. As a result,
congressional-executive agreements may face less opposition when the subject matter committees are
less hostile to the international agreement than the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Hathaway,
supra note 8, at 1314-15. Of course, the opposite may also be true.
222. Some scholars have argued that tax treaties have deleterious effects that are often ignored.
John Avery Jones has found fault with tax treaties since their proliferation removes incentives to reform
the underlying domestic law sensibly and may lock in bad policy. John F. Avery Jones, The David R.
Tillinghast Lecture: Are Tax Treaties Necessary?, 53 TAX L. REv. 1, 4 (1999); see also Tsilly Dagan,
The Tax Treaties Myth, 32 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 939 (2000) (concluding that tax treaties are not
necessary to reduce double taxation and that they reallocate revenues from developing countries to
developed countries); Adam H. Rosenzweig, Thinking Outside the (Tax) Treaty, 2012 Wis. L. REV. 717,
726-28 (contending that a non-treaty-based, rather than a treaty-based, cooperation mechanism among
nations would incentivize poorer countries to help enforce the international tax regime). To the extent
one agrees with such views, then the reduction in tax treaties, of course, may be seen as a favorable
development. I take the different view that although tax treaties produce certain negative effects, an
enhanced treaty process would improve upon their substance. See supra notes 200-219 and
accompanying discussion.
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obligations in violation of international law. Tax treaties are overridden with a
greater frequency than other treaties,223 as demonstrated by several examples
well-known among tax professionals and our treaty partners.224 In a statement
aimed at the United States, the OECD has condemned tax treaty overrides,
arguing that their prevalence disrupts the certainty of international tax
matters.225 Indeed, the Treasury Department has expressed the fear that
overrides have made negotiating tax treaties "increasingly difficult." 226
All of these overridden tax treaties became law without the involvement
of the House. Although it is difficult to conclude with certainty, it seems likely
that some of these overrides occurred, at least in part, due to the House's
exclusion from the treaty process. This hypothesis is supported by the pattern in
which the House, in contrast with the Senate, has consistently advocated for
227
greater authority to override tax treaty obligations. Given the House's
special role in formulating domestic tax legislation, the omission of the House
from the treaty process threatens the power of House members, particularly
those on the Ways and Means committee.228 Involving the House in the tax
223. See Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, International Tax as International Law, 57 TAX L. REV. 483,
493 (2004) [hereinafter Avi-Yonah, International Tax] ("The most notorious difference between tax
treaties and other U.S. treaties is the frequency of treaty overrides (other treaties are overridden, but
much less frequently)."). But cf Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Tax Treaty Overrides: A Qualied Defence of
U.S. Practice, in TAx TREATIES AND DOMESTIC LAW 65, 66 (Guglielmo Maisto ed., 2008) [hereinafter
Avi-Yonah, Tax Treaty Overrides] (arguing that the problem of tax treaty overrides has been
exaggerated).
224. For instance, expatriation provisions, which target U.S. citizens who lose their citizenship,
are an example of tax treaty overrides. See, e.g., Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of
1996, 42 U.S.C. § 2015, Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110 Stat. 1936, 2093 (1996); see also H.R. REP. NO. 104-
736, at 329 (1996) (Conf. Rep.) (explicitly acknowledging an intent to override existing tax treaties).
Other examples of tax treaty overrides abound and exhaustive lists can be found elsewhere in the
literature. See, e.g., Richard L. Doernberg, Overriding Tax Treaties: The U.S. Perspective, 9 EMORY
INT'L L. REv. 71, 82-115 (1995); Infanti, supra note 4, at 682-83; Mark J. Wolff, Congressional
Unilateral Tax Treaty Overrides: The "Latter in Time Doctrine" Is Out of Time!, 9 FL. TAX REV. 700,
732-47 (2009).
225. See Org. for Econ. Cooperation & Dev., Comm. on Fiscal Affairs, Report on Tax Treaty
Overrides, 2 TAx NOTES INT'L 25 (1990).
226. See Pending Bilateral Tax Treaties and OECD Tax Convention: Hearing Before the S.
Comm. on Foreign Relations, 101st Cong. 13 (1990) (statement of Kenneth W. Gideon, Assistant
Secretary for Tax Policy, U.S. Dep't of Treasury).
227. See Irwin Halpern, United States Treaty Obligations, Revenue Laws, and New Section
7852(d) of the Internal Revenue Code, 5 FL. INT'L L.J. 1, 10-11, 18-23 (1989) (discussing the House's
aggressive position with respect to overriding current treaty obligations in the context of the 1962, 1986,
and 1988 revenue acts). The House has also, at times, mandated information on tax treaties from
Treasury, while the Senate has not, perhaps as a result of the House's omission from the treaty
negotiation process. See H.R. Rep. No. 108-755, at 594-95 (2004) (Conf. Rep.) (setting forth a House
bill request that Treasury study the impact of tax treaties); Driessen, supra note 203, at 746 n.8.
228. See Avi-Yonah, International Tax, supra note 223, at 494.
The reason that tax is particularly sensitive in [the context of treaty overrides] is first, that
tax law changes all the time while treaties are slow to renegotiate, and second, that the
U.S. House of Representatives has a special role to play in the tax area (all revenue
measures must originate with it), but is excluded from involvement with treaties, and
therefore insists on its right to change tax treaties through legislation even though this
clearly violates customary international law ....
Id.; see also Doernberg, supra note 224, at 78 ("In the treaty ratification process, the House of
Representatives has no official role. Consequently, some House members may resent the exclusive
authority of the Senate in that area."); CONG. RESEARCH SERV., TAX TREATIES: THE LEGISLATIVE
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treaty process would likely reduce the need for the House to express its policy
preferences in later, disruptive legislative overrides.229 Also, tapping into the
House's expertise (gained by its specialization in revenue policy) might
decrease the number of overrides. 230 For instance, many overrides are enacted
to address abusive transactions developed subsequent to the tax treaty. It could
be argued that leveraging the House's familiarity with tax issues might result in
addressing such abusive transactions upfront, reducing the necessity of later
overrides, at least at the margin.
Second, the use of implementing legislation or congressional-executive
agreements would result in agreements that are more likely to be enforceable
by the judiciary, an issue that has long been a conundrum in the international
law community. Whether a treaty is self-executing or requires implementing
legislation-separate and apart from a constitutional requirement for such
legislation-has never been clear in the United States. Since the Supreme
Court's Medellin decision, in which it held that the circumstances and text of a
treaty made it non-self-executing, this uncertainty has increased.231 As
discussed above, some international law experts have interpreted that decision
to create a presumption against self-execution, and, since Medellin, lower
courts have indeed adopted such a presumption.232 This development should
concern those who value the United States' honoring its international
agreements. Even if this proposition does not appeal to intrinsic sensibilities,
the United States' inability to uphold its international tax agreements may
jeopardize its negotiating position or cause its treaty partners to terminate
agreements. Either of these results would be detrimental to those U.S. entities
and individuals who invest trillions of dollars abroad.
OVERRIDE PROBLEM, reprinted in Harry G. Gourevitch, CRS Report Favors Treaty Override Articles in
Future Conventions, 93 TAx NOTES INT'L 172-15, at *4 (LEXIS).
Conflicts between tax treaties and domestic tax legislation ultimately arise from the
Constitutional separation of powers between Congress and the executive branch, the one
to make tax policy, the other to enter into treaties with the advice and consent of the
Senate. Congress, especially the House of Representatives, has less input into the
contents of tax treaties than the contents of domestic tax legislation.
CONG. RESEARCH SERV., supra, at *4 (LEXIS). It should be noted that during the treaty-making process,
the Senate Foreign Relations Committee sometimes consults with the House Ways and Means
Committee. Doemberg, supra note 224, at 77. This minimal participation, however, does not replicate
full participation by the House, let alone its role originating revenue legislation.
229. See Avi-Yonah, Tax Treaty Overrides, supra note 223, at 75-78. It is very unlikely,
however, that either of my proposals would completely eliminate tax treaty overrides.
230. The House's origination power allows it to specialize in revenue policy, avoiding
duplicative information gathering by the Senate, and to leverage its ability to obtain information more
cheaply than the Senate due to its larger number of members. See Noel Sargent, Bills for Raising
Revenue Under the Federal and State Constitutions, 4 MINN. L. REv. 330, 352 (1920) ("Perhaps the
greatest present-day advantage of the system is that by it each House is able to concentrate on the
preparation of certain kinds of bills, thus assuring more expert knowledge and less duplication than
otherwise would exist."). Relatedly, Adrian Vermeule has argued that the House, without the
Origination Clause, might capitalize on its informational expertise by bargaining for first-mover
advantage, rendering the actual inclusion of the Clause unnecessary. Adrian Vermeule, The
Constitutional Law of Congressional Procedure, 71 U. CHI. L. REv. 361, 426-27 (2004).
231. Hathaway, supra note 8, at 1321; see supra notes 110-116 and accompanying text.
232. Hathaway et al., supra note 7, at 71-76.
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In contrast to these precautionary measures, implementing legislation and
congressional-executive agreements eliminate the risk of a court finding tax
treaties unenforceable. Although the Senate has recently attached to their
consent to tax treaties statements that the treaty is self-executing, it is unclear
whether such a precaution suffices to establish obligations under domestic law.
Medellin focused on the language of the treaty, rather than any statement by the
Senate. 233 Moreover, if the treaty itself contained a statement of self-execution,
it may be possible for the Senate to later contradict that statement in its consent,
creating further uncertainty.234 Finally, a declaration by the executive branch
that a treaty is self-executing might present constitutional concerns.235
Implementing legislation and congressional-executive agreements
provide a straightforward way to create international law that is binding both
abroad and domestically. In light of Medellin and tax treaty overrides, the
importance of stabilizing the United States' treaty obligations has risen. The
proposals herein would improve the nation's reputation as an actor in the
236international community and its ability to negotiate treaties. Private actors,
here and abroad, would also benefit from greater stability in the legal regime.
4. The Enduring Value of the Origination Clause
Because of the Senate's broad power to amend revenue legislation,237
some might argue that the Origination Clause is largely toothless. Indeed, one
of the Framers, James Wilson, poetically asserted this to be true:
With regard to the pursestrings, it was to be observed that the purse was to have
two strings, one of which was in the hands of the [House of Representatives]
the other in those of the Senate. Both houses must concur in untying, and of
what importance could it be which untied first, which last. 238
If Wilson is correct that the Origination Clause is practically meaningless, we
should not risk compromising the important job of tax treaty-making by
woodenly insisting upon implementing or approval legislation. Such a view,
however, is unpersuasive.
233. Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 556 (2007).
234. This perplexing phenomenon recently occurred in two trade treaties. See Treaty with
Australia Concerning Defense Trade Cooperation, U.S.-Aus., pmbl., Sept. 5, 2007, S. TREATY Doc. No.
110-10 ("Understanding that the provisions of this Treaty are self-executing in the United States .... .");
Treaty with United Kingdom Concerning Defense Trade Cooperation, U.S.-U.K., pmbl., June 21-26,
2007, S. TREATY DOc. No. 110-7; Hollis, supra note 201. It is unclear whether, in such instances, the
intent of the Senate or the Executive should govern.
235. Vazquez, Treaties as Law of the Land, supra note 105, at 685-94.
236. Foreign governments, for instance, are more likely to agree to treaties if they have
confidence that the President will be able to secure domestic support of the treaty obligations. See, e.g.,
Putnam, supra note 201, at 439.
237. See, e.g., Rainey v. United States, 232 U.S. 310, 317 (1914) (holding that the Senate's
addition of an excise tax to a tariff bill was within its amendment powers under the Origination Clause,
refusing to determine whether such amendment was within the purposes of the original bill); Flint v.
Stone Tracy Co., 220 U.S. 107, 143 (1911) (holding that the Senate's substitution of a corporate tax for
an inheritance tax did not violate the Origination Clause); see also Kysar, supra note 22, at 3-4
(concluding that the Senate's amendment powers under the Origination Clause are necessarily broad due
to separation of powers concerns).
238. 2 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 25, at 275.
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Although those proposed versions of the Clause that denied or limited the
Senate's power to amend revenue legislation surely would have granted more
power to the House, the House still enjoys significant influence relative to the
Senate in the area of tax legislation. The Senate, after all, cannot act formally
on revenue legislation until the House does so. This dynamic bestows upon the
House the ability to dictate or control the policy agenda, or, in terms of political
game theory, gives them first-mover advantage.239 This advantage accrues
because "the first-mover may obtain a disproportionate share of the gains"
since the "ability to make an initial offer .. . gives the second player only an
iota more than the second player would obtain at the end of the sequence of
offers and responses." 2 40 The second player, put in this position, accepts
because she can do no better. 241
Another way to illustrate the importance of agenda control is through the
Condorcet voting paradox. Assuming that Congress would prefer Policy A over
Policy B, Policy B over Policy C, and Policy C over Policy A, the requirement
of majority rule provides no clear winner consistent across voting variations.
Policy A will win if it competes against the winner of a vote between Policy B
and Policy C. Policy C, however, will be the victor if Congress first votes
between Policy A and Policy B. In summary, the policy outcome depends upon
the control of the agenda rather than majority preferences.242 If Congressional
preferences are intransitive as in this example, the House's ability to move first
in the revenue arena is powerful indeed. Perhaps even more powerful, however,
is the informal (and unquantifiable) advantage the House gains by framing the
political discourse.
Furthermore, it has been suggested that the Origination Clause has no
continuing relevance because Coasian bargaining can circumvent it due to the
intra-congressional institutions that greatly reduce transaction costs.243 Long
before Coase, Madison also set forth this argument:
Experience proved that ["the exclusive privilege of originating money bills"]
had no effect. If seven States in the upper branch wished a bill to be originated,
they might surely find some member from some of the same States in the lower
branch who would originate it. The restriction as to amendment was of as little
consequence. Amendments could be handed privately by the Senate to
members in the other house.244
239. Vermeule, supra note 230, at 424.
240. Id.
241. Id. Vermeule correctly notes that the advantage is of an uncertain degree and depends
upon how rapidly the value of a later agreement declines, the relative rate at which the players discount
future gains, and whether there are reputational costs. Id. Nevertheless, the literature indicates "an
appreciable first-mover advantage in the legislative game." Id. at 425 (citing Gerald S. Strom & Barry S.
Rundquist, A Revised Theory of Winning in House-Senate Conferences, 71 AM. POL. SCi. REV. 448, 450
(1977) ("[T]he chamber that acts first on a bill tends to have the greatest impact on the content of a bill
prior to the conference.")).
242. See KENNETH ARROW, SOCIAL CHOICE AND INDIVIDUAL VALUES 3 (2d ed. 1963).
243. Donald Wittman, The Constitution as an Optimal Social Contract: A Transaction Cost
Analysis of the Federalist Papers, in THE FEDERALIST PAPERS AND THE NEW INSTITUTIONALISM 73, 75-
76 (Bernard Frofman & Donald Witman eds., 1989).
244. 2 PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 1025-26 (Henry Gilpin ed., J. & H.G. Langley 1840).
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Adrian Vermeule, however, rightly dismisses these concerns due to the
incorrectness of the assumption that the House has no entitlement to the Clause
or that such entitlement is unenforceable.245 In other words, although the
houses may contract around the Origination Clause as Madison suggested, the
House will demand a payment for such a bargain and is thus advantaged by the
Origination Clause.246
One might also object that the original justification for the Origination
Clause has diminished. One aspect of the Clause's inclusion in the Constitution
was that the House was directly elected by the people and thereby closer to
them. This political proximity assisted, it was hoped, in the assessment of
tolerable and fair taxes. Since 1913, however, the people, rather than state
legislators, have directly elected Senators in accordance with the Seventeenth
247Amendment. Does this render the purpose of the clause meaningless?
Hardly; the primary consideration in exchange for the Origination Clause was,
after all, the geographic apportionment of the Senate. Although direct election
of representatives establishes a connection with the people, so does the
proportional allotment of representatives, which the House, and the House
alone, retains. Beyond that, Representatives are elected every two and Senators
only every six years.248 As a result, Representatives are more immediately and
directly accountable to their constituents, who can effectuate a change in
representation frequently. The Senate, by contrast, is more insulated from
popular opinion.
5. The Diminished Value of the Treaty Clause
The continued relevance of the Origination Clause and the democratic,
political economy, and practical benefits resulting from the inclusion of the
House in the tax treaty process strongly support implementing or approval
legislation in that context. The case for such a requirement becomes even more
apparent as the purported benefits of the Treaty Clause shrink under modem
scrutiny.
Foremost among the reasons mentioned by the Framers in vesting the
treaty power exclusively with the Senate was that matters of foreign importance
required secrecy in negotiations and expertise upon foreign matters that the
House could not provide.249 As to the former consideration, if the remedy is
implementing legislation, the House does not participate in the earlier stages of
the treaty-making process. In reality, however, the House's participation in the
245. Vermeule, supra note 230, at 425-26. As explored supra Subsection II.A.2, the Supreme
Court has held the Origination Clause to be justiciable and has considered challenges under it on the
merits. See supra notes 42-44 and accompanying text.
246. Vermeule, supra note 230, at 425-26.
247. U.S. CONsT. amend. XVII.
248. Gerrymandering, however, may mute this difference between the two houses by
lengthening the tenure of Representatives. See Easterbrook, supra note 219. It is difficult to conclude
with certainty, however, whether the House's longer tenure is purely the result of undemocratic forces
and hence the extent to which the democratic nature of the House, as compared with the Senate, has
been compromised.
249. See supra notes 85-87 and accompanying text.
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later stages will necessitate its early involvement to ensure that it is on board
with the content of the treaty.
Still, this original justification of the Treaty Clause no longer seems to
carry much weight. The Framers' concerns were based upon the House's larger
number of members whose shorter terms meant that they might reveal national
secrets during their more frequent trips home. The advent of modem
technology, however, gives Senators ample opportunity to spread information
from their seats in the capital, so it is doubtful this vulnerability remains solely
in the House. Even immediately after the American Revolution, a Senator
250leaked the terms of a treaty to the press. The inability to keep a secret has
likely grown with the size of the Senate (originally twenty-two and now one
hundred), as well as with technological advances. Similarly, Jay's and
Hamilton's arguments that the House, as a discontinuous body, lacked
mechanisms to transmit information on foreign affairs between successive
houses and could not be convened in time to approve treaties, are irrelevant in
the modem era.251
Another substantial concern expressed by the Framers was that the House
members, as more transient than their counterparts in the upper house, lacked
expertise in foreign matters and were not aligned with the national interest. Of
course, we routinely trust the House with matters of international tax policy and
indeed require that any such legislation originate in that body. Since such
legislation serves as the framework around which our tax treaty system is
negotiated, this historical concern is no longer relevant. Moreover, the House's
ability to initiate a tax system that is nimble and responsive to the concerns of
its constituents would seem to outweigh its lack of knowledge on general
matters of foreign policy. Furthermore, this concern was more acute during a
time when Senators were not directly elected and hence were thought to
represent the sophisticated viewpoints of the state delegates, rather than the
populace. Because Senators are now popularly elected under the Seventeenth
Amendment, this justification has lost traction.252 This concern may also have
had greater importance if the Senate functioned as a true council of advisors, as
originally envisioned by the Founders. Yet by the end of Washington's
presidency, "'advice and consent' had been reduced to 'consent' alone." 253
The other motivation for the Treaty Clause-the protection of regional
interests or a minority of states-similarly carries little weight in the
international tax context. Tax treaties usually will not implicate regional
concerns or affect a minority of states disproportionately. 254 After all, in the
250. Hathaway, supra note 8, at 1281.
251. See supra notes 88-90 and accompanying text.
252. U.S. CONST. amend. XVII.
253. Hathaway, supra note 8, at 1308 (arguing for participation by the House in all international
agreements); see also supra notes 95-99 and accompanying text.
254. In rare instances, positions taken by the United States in tax treaties might conflict with the
interests of the more populous states. For instance, until the mid-1980s, many states, such as California,
employed a unitary method that taxed income based on a formulary apportionment. This method was in
tension with the position taken by the United States in its international agreements, which is based upon
a separate accounting methodology and only imposes tax on the profits arising within a jurisdiction.
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trade context, which increases the flows of trade between nations in a manner
analogous to the tax treaty context, congressional-executive agreements are
almost uniformly employed without concern that regional interests are being
forsaken. 255 Although of historical interest, the regional and secrecy concerns
that shaped the Treaty Clause are largely irrelevant from a normative
perspective. To be sure, regional concerns also motivated the Origination
Clause by benefitting the large states. Although tax treaties may not implicate
the interests of large states, they do implicate the democratic concerns
underlying the Origination Clause, as discussed above. 256 Finally, if indeed the
large and small states gave the Senate the power to amend revenue bills in
order to protect the Senate's jurisdiction over foreign matters,257 then a
mechanism is already built into the Constitution that achieves balance between
the House's origination power and the Senate's treaty power-the Senate's
amendment power over revenue legislation.258
D. Relevant Precedent Supports Involvement of the House
By and large, congressional practice, as well as case law, confirms the
foregoing analysis. A discussion of the relevant precedent follows.
1. Judicial Views on the Constitutionality ofSelf-Executing Tax
Treaties
There is scant case law involving the Origination Clause and its
relationship with international agreements. The only case where the issue was
briefed directly is Lidas v. United States,259 in which French citizens contested
a summons by the United States Internal Revenue Service for information in
accordance with a bilateral tax treaty entered into by the United States and
France. Among the arguments set forth by the taxpayers was that the self-
executing tax treaty was unconstitutional since it was a revenue-raising bill
within the scope of the Origination Clause.260 The Lidas court, however, did
not directly address that argument, holding instead that the appellants only
International outrage, perhaps most vehemently expressed by the United Kingdom, caused California to
change its methodology. During a later renegotiation of the United Kingdom-United States treaty, a draft
treaty initially curtailed the states' ability to employ the unitary method but was removed due to
constitutional and political concems. See Roger Berner & Gregory May, The New U.K.-U.S. Income Tax
Treaty, in PLI TAX STRATEGIES FOR CORPORATE ACQUISITIONS, DISPOSITIONS, SPIN-OFFS, JOINT
VENTURES, FINANCINGS, REORGANIZATIONS & RESTRUCTURINGS 518 (2008).
255. Hathaway, supra note 8, at 1286.
256. See supra notes 200-210.
257. See MADISON, supra note 28, at 415 (statement of Colonel Mason).
258. Perhaps even the fact that the Founders viewed the Origination Clause as a potential threat
to the Senate's purview over foreign matters indicates that they assumed the Origination Clause to
encompass international obligations as well as domestic legislation.
259. 238 F.3d 1076 (9thCir. 2001).
260. Brief for Appellant at 4, Lidas, 238 F.3d at 1076 (No. 99-55692). The plaintiffs primary
constitutional argument was that the treaty violated Article I § 8, the first clause of which enumerates the
powers of Congress, including the power to lay and collect taxes, because it was not enacted by
Congress. Id. at 9.
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challenged the treaty's exchange of information provisions, rather than its
revenue-related provisions, which did not violate the Constitution.261
Two cases speak of the interaction between the Treaty Clause and the
Origination Clause, albeit in dicta, concluding that the latter limits the former.
In Swearingen v. United States,262 a taxpayer sued the United States to recover
taxes, claiming that the Panama Canal Treaty exempted certain taxes. The
district court held that conflicting provisions in the Code superseded the
agreement and that the treaty itself did not contain the claimed exemption.263
Also in dicta, the court ventured further, stating that even if the treaty could be
interpreted to contain such an exemption, it would still be invalid as standing
"in contravention of the exclusive constitutional authority of the House of
Representatives to originate all bills for raising revenues." 264
In another case, Edwards v. Carter, the D.C. Circuit dismissed a
265challenge to the same treaty. Appellants had argued that the power to
dispose of United States property required approval of both Houses of
Congress because of Article IV, Section 3, Clause 2 of the Constitution,266
which was an exclusive grant of such power. Accordingly, they argued, the
Panama Canal Treaty, which was a self-executing treaty, could not convey such
property to foreign states. 267 The court of appeals dismissed this challenge,
reasoning that the language of the clause did not set forth an exclusive
congressional power precluding the entering of a self-executing treaty.268 The
D.C. Circuit went on to note that, in contrast to the matter at hand, certain
grants of authority are exclusively bestowed by the Constitution such as the
appropriation of money and the imposition of taxes. 269
261. 238 F.3d at 1080-81. In so doing, the court concluded that even if the treaty's double
taxation provisions did require implementing legislation, the information provisions were severable. Id.
at 1081. In conclusory fashion, the district court below dismissed the plaintiffs argument that tax
treaties are not "bills for raising revenue." Lidas, Inc. v United States, No. CV-98-4503-DT(RCX) 1999
WL 164409, at *5 (C.D. Cal Feb. 5, 1999). The court also was persuaded that participation by the Joint
Committee on Taxation in the preparation of the treaty's technical explanation provided requisite
participation by the House. Id. at *6. This latter argument seems especially weak; the participation of a
few members of the House is not constitutionally equivalent to the requirement that tax laws originate in
the House and are passed by a vote of its full body.
262. 565 F. Supp. 1019 (D. Colo. 1983).
263. Id. at 1020-21.
264. Id. at 1022. This language implicitly accepts the view that bills that reduce revenue are
nonetheless "bills for raising revenue" under the Origination Clause. J. Michael Medina, The
Origination Clause in the American Constitution: A Comparative Survey, 23 TULSA L.J. 165, 183 (1987)
The dicta also acknowledges that tax treaties are "bills" for purposes of the clause.
265. 580 F.2d 1055, 1058 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
266. Article IV, Section 3, Clause 2 of the Constitution reads: "The Congress shall have Power
to dispose of and make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property
belonging to the United States, and nothing in this Constitution shall be so construed as to Prejudice any
Claims of the United States, or of any particular State." U.S. CONsT. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2.
267. 580 F.2d at 1057.
268. Id. at 1057-58.
269. Id. at 1058. The dissent also agreed with this contention. See id. at 1070 (MacKinnon, J.,dissenting).
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2. Congressional Views on the Constitutionality ofSelf-
Executing Tax Treaties
Many treaties involving revenue, including all income tax treaties, have
not been presented to Congress. Before the modem era, however, Congress
regularly implemented treaties that modified domestic tax laws. 2 70 Indeed, the
House systematically asserted its right to execute such treaties up until the early
twentieth century as a means to protect its origination privilege. 271 On one
occasion defending such a right in 1878, a representative commented:
[I]n all the history of the treaty-making of the United States, a question in
respect to or touching upon the question of revenue, or where appropriation has
been required to carry out the effect of the treaty, it has been the uniform
practice, with a single exception, to submit those treaties and those matters to
the House of Representatives; and the treaties have not gone into effect until the
House of Representatives have joined in the proper legislation to change the
revenue or make the appropriation. 272
One commentator has concluded that for all treaties affecting revenue
between 1796 and 1913, the House has "uniformly insisted upon, but the
Senate has acquiesced in, legislation by Congress to give effect to such
stipulations," 273 with consistent cooperation from the Executive. 2 74 In the late
1880s, an extensive report was issued by the chairman of the House Judiciary
Committee, analyzing the terms of the Constitution, English precedents, the
debates of the Founders, and the precedents of the House between 1796 and
1816 to establish that, indeed, tax treaties could not be completed without
assent of the House. 27 A nearly contemporaneous House report concludes with
the following resolution: "Resolved, That the President by advice and consent
of the Senate, cannot negotiate treaties with foreign Governments by which the
duties levied by Congress can be changed or abrogated, and such treaties to be
operative as law must have the sanction of an act of Congress." 276
270. Sargent, supra note 230, at 343.
271. For instance, in 1919, a Congressman declared the Canadian Reciprocity Act, a tariff act,
illegal since the president's treaty-making power does not extend to revenue measures, the origination of
which must be in the House. Id. at 342; see also HENRY ST. GEORGE TUCKER, LIMITATIONS ON THE
TREATY-MAKING POWER 342-79 (1915) (discussing a report of the chairman of the House Judiciary
Committee of the 49th Congress defending the claim that a treaty cannot change revenue laws without
sanction of the House).
272. 2 HINDS' PRECEDENTS, supra note 58, § 1459, p. 9 5 9 .
273. SAMUEL B. CRANDALL, TREATIES: THEIR MAKING AND ENFORCEMENT 195 (2d ed. 1916);
see also H.R. REP. No. 68-1569, at 8 (1925) (recounting the House's general insistence upon
implementation of treaties affecting revenue legislation and tariffs, with acquiescence by the Senate).
274. Another source indicates that between 1789 and 1936, thirteen House precedents involved
the interaction between the Origination and Treaty Clauses. All but one of these precedents supported
the conclusion that the treaty power gives way to the Origination Clause, and many of these
affirmatively indicate support for such a proposition by the Executive and Senate. 2 HINDS'
PRECEDENTS, supra note 58, §§ 1520-1533; 6 CANNON'S PRECEDENTS, supra note 60, § 324.
275. This report is reproduced in TUCKER, supra note 271, at 342-79. The committee did not
have time to vote on the report contemporaneously, however, three years later, the committee adopted a
very similar version to support a resolution that a treaty involving duties on imports did not have legal
affect without an act of Congress. 2 HINDS' PRECEDENTS, supra note 58, § 1529.
276. H.R. REP. No. 48-2680 (1885); see also 2 HINDS' PRECEDENTS, supra note 58, § 1528.
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For example, a 1796 treaty with Great Britain, which exempted certain
British goods from tariffs imposed by the domestic revenue laws, was
implemented by legislation that incorporated the relevant provisions into the
domestic law. 277 Numerous other early treaties involving revenue were
implemented through legislation, including one in which President Jackson sent
a copy to Congress observing that some of its provisions could only be carried
out by a legislative act.278 Jackson did not proclaim the treaty until it was
approved by legislation. 2 79 Although a senator offered a resolution declaring
that this particular act should not be taken as precedent for the exercise of the
treaty-making power, the resolution was tabled. 280 After several later treaties
affecting revenue were enacted through implementing legislation,281 the Senate
itself approved ratification of one such treaty with the condition that it be
implemented through legislation.282
Although the House has not asserted this right with any meaningful vigor
since the advent and proliferation of modem bilateral tax treaties, the number
and consistency of precedents involving the Origination Clause provides a great
deal of historical support if such actions were taken today. The lack of action
by the House to protect its participation in modem-day tax treaties also does
not cure the constitutional concerns; it only heightens them. 283 As discussed
above, the Court enforces the Clause even when the House has chosen not to do
so.284
Additionally, the House's silence should not be read as acquiescence in
this context.285 The House, after all, is comprised of multiple actors, and a
collective interpretation of its constitutional rights is difficult to discern from
inaction.286 This is, in part, due to the constraints placed on the House's agenda
and procedural obstacles that any such measure faces.287 The House's silence
may also stem from the practical limitations of any objection to self-executing
tax treaties. The President and the Senate, after all, may simply choose to
277. CRANDALL,supra note 273, at 183.
278. Id. at 188-89.
279. Id.
280. Id.
281. Id at 189-91.
282. Id. at 192.
283. INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 944-45 (1983) (stating that increasing frequency of
unconstitutional conduct sharpens the Court's inquiry rather than blunts it); see also Powell v.
McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 546-47 (1969) (holding that misinterpretation of the Constitution by the
other branches over an extended period of time does not bind the Court).
284. United States v. Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. 385, 387-88 (1990) (holding that a revenue
statute passed in violation of the Origination Clause did not present a non-justiciable political question).
285. Prescribing implementing legislation in the tax treaty context would thus be in keeping
with findings that courts tend to not enforce treaties when enforcement would conflict with the desires of
Congress. See Wu, supra note 111, at 583-87 (providing an institutional deference explanation for the
case law involving self-execution, finding that judicial enforcement of treaties typically results from
state breaches of treaties).
286. See Curtis A. Bradley & Trevor W. Morrison, Historical Gloss and the Separation of
Powers, 126 HARv. L. REV. 411, 451 (2012); William N. Eskridge, Jr., Interpreting Legislative Inaction,
87 MICH. L. REv. 67 (1988).
287. Cf Eskridge, supra note 286, at 98-99 (speaking of such constraints in the context of
Congress, as a whole).
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ignore the House's protests. Although the Origination Clause is justiciable, it is
unclear that members of the House would have standing to challenge any
288
constitutional violation, and enforcement of its rights by private parties is
also limited in the tax treaty context. 289
Moreover, the House's silence on the issue seems to have been born out
of happenstance. Although the House had previously been involved in the
implementation of tariff agreements, tariffs receded in importance once the
Constitution permitted an income tax in 1913.290 By the time of the first
income tax treaty two decades later in 1932,291 the House's guardianship over
its role in international tax agreements may have been lost in the annals of
history.292 Additionally, because this was the era of the Great Depression, the
House may have feared retribution for any action that could be construed as
obstructing trade.293 To conclude that the House forever waived its
constitutional rights seems problematic considering the novelty of the
instrument and the economic reality of the times in which it was failing to
defend such rights. This is particularly true considering the uphill battle the
House would face against the Senate and the President in reasserting its
rights. 294
That being said, the model treaties are powerful forces in shaping the
negotiations of individual tax treaties,295 and it is possible that the House sees
little need to be heavily involved in the process as a result. Although the model
treaties likely diminish the need for congressional involvement, they by no
means eradicate it. The Senate actively attaches conditions to its consent to tax
treaties and is somewhat involved in the negotiation process.296 We could
expect the House to act in a similar fashion, expressing its viewpoint at various
stages in the process. The lack of revenue estimates and cohesive goals of tax
treaties297 also leave room for improvement in the process and areas that could
benefit from House input. Moreover, the large states, as represented in the
House and whose protection the Origination Clause sought, may have the
288. See infra notes 302-303.
289. See infra notes 305-315 and accompanying discussion.
290. U.S. CONST. amend. XVI.
291. Tax Convention, supra note 102.
292. Just prior to the modem income tax era, beginning in 1887, international agreements in the
trade and tariff context were rising in importance as previously protectionist policies began to shift.
Hathaway, supra note 8, at 1240. Some have argued that such agreements were enacted in the
congressional-executive agreement format, rather than through treaties, because of the House's
traditional prerogatives in the revenue area. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW
OF THE UNITED STATES § 303 reporters' n.9 (1987).
293. The author thanks Philip Postlewaite for this hypothesis.
294. Another theory explaining the House's reticence is the increasing nationalization of
politics in the modem era, which ties together the fates of the two houses, possibly diminishing jealousy
between them. See Charles Stewart III, Congress and the Constitutional System, in THE LEGISLATIVE
BRANCH 3, 21 (Paul J. Quirk & Sarah A. Binder eds., 2005).
295. See supra notes 138-141 and accompanying discussion.
296. See infra note 317 and accompanying discussion.
297. See supra notes 202-210 and accompanying discussion.
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market power necessary to demand deviation from the standard rules in the
model treaty.298
E. Responses to Possible Counter-Arguments
As discussed above, the text, history, and structure of the Constitution, as
well as relevant precedent and normative considerations, support the conclusion
that self-executing tax treaties raise deep constitutional concerns. Although this
position is not without counterarguments, such concerns are ultimately
unpersuasive.
1. Last in Time Rule as Insufficient Protection
One critique of the view espoused in this Article might be that the last in
time rule offers sufficient protection of the House's constitutional right to
originate tax legislation. 29 9 The House, so the argument would go, can override
any tax treaty by initiating a bill; if approved by the Senate and Executive, the
later-enacted statute would trump the tax treaty. This reasoning, however,
ignores the realities of global politics and the legislative process.
Of foremost concern, congressional overrides, although sanctioned by
domestic law, violate international law. 300 We should not expect the House to
protect its constitutional right through illegal means. Although the House has
shown willingness to override tax treaties, it likely does so much less often than
it would if such an act were authorized by international law and accepted
without protest by our treaty partners. Indeed, many legislative proposals are
abandoned or narrowed out of concern that the legislation would override tax
treaties. 301
Moreover, the constitutional bargain struck gave the large states the right
to effectively veto revenue legislation through inaction. The response that the
last in time rule protects such a right turns that bargain on its head by requiring
action (and bicameral action at that) in order for the House to be able to dictate
298. See, e.g., supra note 254 (recounting the ability of California to impose formulary
apportionment, in contradiction with many tax treaties).
299. Anthony Infanti has argued that Congress lacks the constitutional authority to override tax
treaties because the Treaty Clause precludes its participation in the treaty-making process. Infanti, supra
note 4, at 709-13. Infanti noted the important separation of powers concerns that arose from his thesis
but concluded that the Origination Clause actually justifies it. The last in time rule, according to Infanti,
improperly injects the House into the treaty-making process by giving it de facto amendment power to
treaties; the Clause exacerbates this problem, he argues, because such amendments originate in the
House. Id. at 709. I respectfully disagree with his thesis and go further to argue that the ability to
override treaties does not sufficiently protect the constitutional prerogative of the House to originate
legislation.
300. Under international law, "[e]very treaty in force is binding upon the parties and must be
performed by them in good faith .... A party may not invoke the provisions of its internal law as
justification for its failure to perform a treaty." Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 26-27,
May 23, 1969, 11 U.N.T.S. 331, 339; see Org. for Econ. Cooperation & Dev., Comm. on Fiscal Affairs,
supra note 225, at 26-28; Avi-Yonah, Tax Treaty Overrides, supra note 223, at 65 ("[Overrides] clearly
violate[] international law as embodied by the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties...."). It
could be argued, however, that our treaty partners are well aware of the last in time rule and thus the
violation of international law is only technical in nature.
301. See Driessen, supra note 203, at 750.
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revenue policy in the treaty context, a much less powerful position for the
House. Additionally, to immediately override a tax treaty, the House would
need the cooperation of the Senate and the Executive, an extremely unlikely
outcome given the passage of the treaty immediately prior. The remedy I
propose protects the House's constitutional right by assuring revenue laws will
not be changed by a treaty if the House chooses not to act.
2. The Enforceability of the Constitutional Claim
Who will prompt Congress and the Executive into adopting this remedy?
It is my hope that Congress and the Executive would uphold their sworn duty to
the Constitution and begin to implement or approve tax treaties through
legislation, without prompting from the courts. This is especially necessary
given that many challenges to the constitutionality of self-executing tax treaties
would encounter standing problems.
Members of Congress may face an uphill battle in obtaining standing to
challenge violations of the Origination Clause. Although a court of appeals has
held that members of the House had standing to challenge whether revenue-
raising bills improperly originated in the Senate,302 the Supreme Court has
since expressed reluctance to grant standing to members of Congress when they
assert an injury to their institutional authority as legislators, rather than a
personal injury.303
Private parties may also have difficulties in satisfying standing
requirements. Tax treaties reduce the tax liabilities imposed upon foreign
entities and individuals and only very indirectly do they increase the tax
liabilities of domestic entities and individuals who may be taxed more as a
result of the revenue lost from tax treaties.304 It is hence unlikely that a plaintiff
would have suffered an "injury in fact" to a legally protected interest that is
"fairly traceable to the challenged action of the defendant" and likely to be
redressed by a favorable judicial decision. 30
There is, however, some support in the equal protection context for
finding standing to challenge tax treaties. In the case of a statute that
unconstitutionally benefits a particular class of individuals in a discriminatory
fashion, the court has held that the redressability prong of the standing inquiry
could be met by denying benefits to that class. Heckler v. Mathews, for
instance, involved the challenge of an award of social security benefits in a
manner that benefitted women. Although Congress provided that such an award
should be severed and nullified in the case of unconstitutionality, thus
302. Moore v. U.S. House of Representatives, 733 F.2d 946, 956 (D.C. Cir. 1984). Although
the Moore court concluded that House members had standing, it dismissed the challenge due to general
separation of powers concerns. Id.
303. Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811 (1997) (holding that members of Congress lacked standing
to challenge the Line Item Veto Act).
304. Although for standing purposes, tax treaties do not directly increase the tax liabilities of
domestic parties, they indeed do so indirectly in a manner sufficient to implicate the democratic
concerns motivating the Origination Clause.
305. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992) (quoting Simon v. E. Ky.
Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 41-42 (1976)).
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providing a remedy that would reduce the amount received by other
beneficiaries rather than increase the amount given to the plaintiff, the Court
nevertheless upheld the plaintiffs standing. 306
Similar reasoning applied in an equal protection challenge to a tax statute.
In Allied Stores v. Bowers, an Ohio resident challenged a state property tax
statute that exempted similar property of nonresidents. 307 Although the Court
could not extend the tax exemption to residents, its ability to nullify the
exemption for nonresidents satisfied the redressability prong of the standing
analysis. 30 In the matter at hand, although courts would be unable to extend
treaty benefits, they could redress the injury by holding that the relevant treaty
provisions bestowing such benefits are unconstitutional. Still, it is unclear
whether the Court would extend this analysis to encompass constitutional
violations under the Origination Clause. In the Equal Protection Clause context,
the legislature's exclusion of the taxpayer from receiving benefits is itself the
injury. In the tax treaty context, however, it is not at all clear that a taxpayer
who was excluded from receiving tax treaty benefits would have fared better
with the participation of the House. In essence, it would be difficult to argue
that a taxpayer suffered an injury due to the violation of the Origination Clause.
To be sure, some provisions in tax treaties, such as information exchange
requirements, impose burdens on foreign taxpayers and therefore may be better
candidates for establishing standing. Such was the case in Lidas v. United
309States. In Lidas, as discussed in Subsection IV.D.1, French citizens argued
that the exchange of information provisions of the U.S.-France tax treaty were
unenforceable in court because the treaty was constitutionally void. 310 The
Lidas court held that, although the citizens suffered an injury in fact that was
fairly traceable to the challenged treaty, they did not meet the redressability
prong of the standing analysis. 311 The court reasoned that the Origination
Clause did not require implementing legislation for the exchange of
information provisions, even if it did for the double taxation provisions of the
312treaty. Because the Lidas court held the exchange of information provisions
to be severable from any unconstitutional portions of the treaty, the French
citizens lacked standing to sue. 313 Following the case law interpreting the
Origination Clause, however, obtaining information with regard to the
economic activities of our treaty partners' citizens and residents seems essential
to assessing the proper U.S. tax liability. It is central to the collection of tax and
hence arguably "raises revenue" within the meaning of the Origination
306. Heckler v. Mathews, 465 U.S. 728, 738-40 (1984).
307. 358 U.S. 522 (1959).
308. Id. at 526.
309. 238 F.3d 1076 (9th Cir. 2001).
310. Brief for Appellant at 4, Lidas v. United States, 238 F.3d 1076 (9th Cir. 2001) (No. 99-
55692).
311. 238 F.3d at l081.
312. Id.
313. Id.
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Clause. 314 Other courts may not follow the overly formalistic severability
analysis in Lidas.
It may also be possible to assert standing in the context of private
contractual agreements. For instance, in a typical credit agreement, the lender
agrees to pay any withholding taxes imposed at the time the lender acquires the
debt (typically referred to as "day one withholding taxes") and the borrower
agrees to pay any withholding taxes imposed thereafter due to a change in the
law. 3 15 If a lender found itself in the position of paying day one withholding
taxes under a reduced treaty rate, they could argue that the treaty was
unconstitutional; hence any withholding taxes imposed on the debt under the
domestic law counterpart to the treaty would arguably be borne by the borrower
since such taxes arise from a change in law. Thus, in these circumstances, an
argument could be made that certain foreign entities and individuals have
standing to challenge the constitutionality of tax treaties.
V. DISCUSSION OF REMEDIES
In this Part, I briefly describe the two possible remedies to the
constitutional defects caused by self-executing tax treaties-implementing
legislation and congressional-executive agreements-and address practical
concerns that they might present. I also suggest options to involve the House in
the treaty process that fall short of a formal vote of the House. Although these
other options likely do not cure the constitutional concern, they help to
legitimize the process and are hence preferable to the status quo.
A. Implementing Legislation
The problem I have identified in this Article is that self-executing tax
treaties, by dictating revenue law and policy without the participation of the
House, are likely unconstitutional abridgments of the Origination Clause. One
cure to this problem is straightforward: tax treaties should be subsequently
implemented with legislation originating in the House. On this account, the
negotiation and ratification process of tax treaties would still involve only the
Executive and the Senate. Subsequent to the exchange of ratification
instruments, the House would originate and pass implementing legislation. The
Senate and President's approval should be simple to obtain since each ratified a
treaty requiring such legislation. Language that such an implementation process
is required by our Constitution and must precede the legal effect of the treaty
should be inserted into the treaty, both as a courtesy to alert our treaty parties
and to protect our negotiating reputation. To alleviate coordination concerns,
the House could employ fast track procedures that would ensure such
314. For an interpretation of the "revenue raising" language in the Origination Clause, see
supra Subsection IV.A.I.
315. Michael L. Schler et al., The LSTA Model Credit Agreement: Overview of Tax Changes,
EXPERT GUIDE: TAX, Sept. 2011, at 54, http://www.corporatelivewire.com/guide.html?id-expert-guide
-tax.
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legislation was placed first on the calendar with limited debate and
amendments. 316
In implementing the treaty, the House may also express reservations
about its content by attaching these to its approval. The Senate currently
engages in this practice in providing advice and consent, and does so somewhat
frequently in the tax treaty context. 317 For instance, in 1999, the Senate
attached a reservation to tax treaties with Italy and Slovenia for removal of
anti-abuse provisions. Although Slovenia acquiesced to this request, Italy did
not, and as a result the treaty with Italy was signed but never entered into
force.318 This practice is not without complications. For instance, a delay
occurred in 1978 when the Senate attached a reservation to a treaty with the
United Kingdom. In 1979 the Senate approved the treaty after the parties
entered into a protocol taking the reservation into account.319 The ratification
process was delayed, but the Senate's ability to participate in the process
altered the treaty's final content. The House could similarly obtain some of its
preferences by attaching reservations.320
To mitigate the risk that the House's involvement would drastically slow
down the tax treaty process, the Executive could communicate with members
from the House of Representatives during the negotiation or drafting of the tax
treaty. Early presidents, for instance, used this strategy when a treaty required
an appropriation, and in some cases the House voted on the implementing
legislation before the Executive presented the treaty to the Senate. 32 1 This
custom would have the added benefit of obtaining the House's views on the
316. See Trade Act of 1974 § 151, Pub. L. No. 93-617, 88 Stat. 1978, 2001 (1975) (codified as
amended at 19 U.S.C. § 2191 (2006)) (expired 2007) (establishing a fast-track procedure for trade
agreements); Harold Koh, Congressional Controls on Presidential Trade Policymaking After I.N.S. v.
Chadha, 18 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 1191, 1202 (1986) (discussing such procedures).
317. For a comprehensive list of eighteen Senate reservations on tax treaties between 1946 and
1980, see Kevin C. Kennedy, Conditional Approval of Treaties by the U.S. Senate, 19 LOY. L.A. INT'L
& CoMP. L. REv. 89, 114 n.118 (1996).
318. Kirsch, supra note 147, at 1093 n.47.
319. LEGISLATIVE ACTIVITIES REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, S. REP.
No. 97-29, at 7-10 (1980).
320. Some scholars have concluded that although treaties involving tax or appropriations
require implementing legislation, the House is under an obligation to carry the treaty into effect and
therefore cannot exercise independent judgment in so doing. See WILLIAM RAWLE, A VIEW OF THE
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 67-68 (1825). Others argue that such a conclusion
"is not in accordance with the conventional wisdom, which presupposes that Congress has political
discretion in these subject areas." Kesavan, supra note 9, at 1599. To be sure, this latter view is a more
modem understanding and is subject to debate. The Jay Treaty Debate of 1796 involved whether the
House of Representatives could refuse to implement treaty obligations. Republicans, led by Jefferson,
argued that this was their constitutional right, whereas Federalists, led by Hamilton and Washington,
argued that the House had no such discretion. Eventually, the House voted to implement the Treaty. See
JERALD A. COMBS, THE JAY TREATY: POLITICAL BATTLEGROUND OF THE FOUNDING FATHERS 187
(1970). Despite the House's "loss" on this issue, the rise of congressional-executive agreements in the
modem era has resulted in an active role for the House in international lawmaking. It is doubtful that
such a role would be considered problematic in the context of tax treaties, given the House's special role
in producing revenue legislation. To require House approval but limit it to a mere formality would be
rather meaningless from the standpoint of protecting the concerns animating the Origination Clause.
321. Hathaway, supra note 8, at 1321.
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treaty's subject matter prior to the finalization of the treaty, which would
reduce the risk of a failure to implement. 322
The implementation remedy may appear overly formalistic; by including
the House only after the treaty is negotiated by the Executive and approved by
the Senate, how does the command for implementing legislation restore the
House's first mover advantage? Although the requirement of implementation
legislation would likely not fully restore the House in this regard, the House
would indeed be able to impact tax policies in the treaty. Formal modeling of
the treaty process helps us appreciate how adding the House alters its control
over the content of the treaty. Borrowing somewhat from a familiar model,323
let us adopt the following references:
SQ=status quo or current policy
H=preference of the House
H'-point at which House is indifferent between SQ and SE
SE=preference of the Senate and Executive
Let us assume that SQ is the non-existence of a bilateral treaty between
Switzerland and the United States that would allow one country to request
information on investments of its citizens and residents that they make in the
other country.324 In this scenario, one can further assume that the Executive and
Senate prefer a treaty to the status quo but that these two players also prefer a
high degree of information sharing. The House also would like a tax treaty with
Switzerland but would like minimal information sharing requirements. Thus,
the continuum of interests could be illustrated as such:
Preferences SQ H H' SE
Existence of No Yes Yes Yes
Treaty
Degree of None Low Medium High
Information
Sharing _
Under the Origination Clause, the House is the agenda-setter and
therefore has first-mover advantage. The House could originate a proposal at H
that would become law. This is because both the Senate and the Executive
prefer H to SQ. In the tax treaty implementation context, however, the House
lacks its typical agenda-setting ability. Thus, the Senate and Executive could,
during treaty negotiations, set the policy at H', the point at which the House is
indifferent between keeping the status quo and implementing the treaty with a
322. Jean Galbraith makes the relevant argument that the Treaty Clause does not bar the Senate
from providing prospective advice and consent during (as opposed to subsequent to) the negotiation
phase of treaty-making. Jean Galbraith, Prospective Advice and Consent, 37 YALE J. INT'L. L. 247
(2012). Similarly, there should be no constitutional barriers from seeking implementing legislation prior
to the treaty's final negotiation.
323. The example derives from positive political theory and is formally modeled in William N.
Eskridge, Jr. & John Ferejohn, The Article , Section 7 Game, 80 GEO. L.J. 523, 529-32 (1992).
324. The author thanks Ruth Mason for this example.
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high degree of information sharing. Even so, the incorporation, as opposed to
exclusion, of House preferences aligns much more closely with the result
contemplated by the drafters of the Origination Clause since otherwise the
policy would be set at SE. Furthermore, it is conceivable that the House could
move the policy more closely back to H by presenting an implementation bill
that conforms to that preference or affecting the treaty negotiation by
expressing its preference to the Treasury or State Departments early in the
negotiation process. In this manner, the treaty will at least partially reflect the
House's preferences whereas, in the absence of my proposal, the treaty would
be enacted with a high degree of information sharing.
One might further contend that certain features of the tax treaty process
negate any first mover advantage that the House might enjoy. As discussed
above, the United States tax treaties are heavily based on the model treaties.
Essentially, the model treaty writers enjoy the first-mover advantage and
therefore cabin the discretion later exercised by the House. In drafting almost
any tax policy proposal, however, the House is not writing upon a clean slate.
The Ways and Means Committee is often encumbered with budgetary rules,
drafts from interested parties, and existing Code structure in designing tax
legislation, and yet the first-mover advantage is still valuable in those settings.
The model paradigm surely mutes the House's agenda-setting ability. Yet the
Senate and Executive set tough and significant policy choices working within
that model, such as withholding tax rates or the level of information exchange.
It is, after all, by no means unprecedented for the Senate to attach conditions to
its consent to a tax treaty even though the treaty is based on the model.325 A
treaty implemented with the House's involvement will better reflect House
policy choices on those issues than under the current system.
B. Congressional-Executive Agreements
In addition to implementing legislation, congressional-executive
agreements would also cure the Origination Clause defect by reinserting the
House into the international tax agreement process. As compared with
implementing legislation, congressional-executive agreements might fare better
at restoring the House's first-mover advantage. The most common
congressional-executive agreements are authorized in advance by legislation. 326
Because such legislation would originate in the House, the House's early
involvement in such an agreement would bring it closer to the agenda-setting
position it enjoys in formulating domestic revenue legislation. As with
implementing legislation, the House should be able to condition its approval
upon substantive requirements. 327
Compared with treaties requiring implementing legislation,
congressional-executive agreements will almost always lessen the number of
325. See supra note 317 and accompanying discussion.
326. Hathaway, supra note 8, at 1255-56. The other type of congressional-executive agreement
is approved by Congress after it is negotiated.
327. Id. at 1331-32.
54 [Vol. 38: I
On the Constitutionality of Tax Treaties
hurdles to enactment due to its single stage process. The legislation approving
of the agreement will include any necessary language implementing it. The
House's early involvement may also lessen the likelihood that it later withholds
assent to the obligation.
To be sure, the constitutionality of congressional-executive agreements is
not beyond doubt. Certain scholars contend that some types of agreements must
be concluded as Article II treaties.328 Others argue that congressional-executive
agreements are "complete alternative[s]" to the Article II process for enacting
32933treaties,39 arguing, for example, that democratic principles justify their use.330
The democratic rationales underlying the Origination Clause make a uniquely
strong case for using congressional-executive agreements in the tax area.33
Indeed, Bruce Ackerman and Daniel Golove have argued that the Origination
Clause provides an additional justification for the use of such agreements in
trade contexts, such as NAFTA. 332 Larry Tribe takes a different view. He notes
that the Origination Clause may prevent the President from entering into a
"self-executing treaty that would directly impose taxes on United States
citizens or draw funds from the public treasury." 333 Nevertheless, he rejects
Ackerman and Golove's conclusion that the necessary involvement of the
House in implementing a treaty requires its approval of the treaty.
Space constraints limit heavy engagement with the literature on the
constitutionality of congressional-executive agreements, and thus my
recommendation for their use assumes their constitutionality. I will note,
however, that congressional-executive agreements have become standard and
uncontroversial practice, indeed evolving into "the primary means of
international lawmaking." 334 Additionally, the pro-constitutionality view has
persuaded much of the scholarly community for decades, 335 in spite of recent
arguments against it.336
328. See Yoo, supra note 149, at 761-62.
329. HENKIN, supra note 111, at 217; see Ackerman & Golove, supra note 4.
330. Hathaway, supra note 8, at 1308-12 (justifying a move towards congressional-executive
agreements and away from treaties because democratic rationales mandate the inclusion of the House);
see also Curtis A. Bradley, International Delegations, the Structural Constitution, and Non-Self
Execution, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1557, 1589-91 (2003) (drawing upon democratic concems to justify the
non-self-execution of the decisions and actions of international institutions).
331. See Ackerman & Golove, supra note 4, at 923.
332. Id.
333. Tribe, supra note 4, at 1261 n.133.
334. Hathaway, supra note 8, at 1306.
335. Id. at 1274; see RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 303 cmt. E (1987) ("The prevailing view is that the Congressional-Executive agreement can
be used as an alternative to the treaty method in every instance."); HENKIN, supra note 111, at 217 ("[I]t
is now widely accepted that the Congressional-Executive agreement is available for wide use, even
general use, and is a complete alternative to a treaty . . . .").
336. See, e.g., Spiro, supra note 191, at 1038; Tribe, supra note 4, at 1252; Yoo, supra note
149, at 761-62.
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C. Informal Input
A final option would increase the informal input from the House.
Although this option would likely not cure the constitutional problem of self-
executing tax treaties, since it fails to obtain formal approval from the House, it
would mitigate concerns over the democratic legitimacy of the process. For
instance, members from the House Ways and Means committee could provide
more robust input during the negotiation stage of a tax treaty. Access to
surrounding facts and records of the negotiations would assist them in this
endeavor. House hearings and floor debate may even be scheduled, with
normal process proceeding just shy of a formal vote.337 A greater role for the
Joint Committee on Taxation through the provision of revenue estimates and
other economic information on the treaties, even if non-binding, would further
enhance deliberation.338
VI. CONCLUSION
In conclusion, the Senate's treaty power cannot be used to circumvent the
House's power to originate revenue bills. To give meaning and effect to the
Origination Clause, and to honor the important principles it advances,
international tax agreements require implementing legislation or congressional-
executive agreements. The Framers created an elaborate system of checks and
balances, including bicameralism, to keep at bay the Tocquevillian nightmare
that the majority would rule in tyranny. The resultant two houses hold different
characteristics, a distinction that further protects the nation against the ills of a
democratic government. Self-executing tax treaties potentially read the
Origination Clause out of the Constitution. In so doing, international tax policy
is deprived of careful and robust deliberation by the most democratically
accountable house. This atrophied process results in tax treaties with ill-defined
and conflicting purposes, overly represented special interests, costs outside of
the budgetary process, and unstable commitments. These are all predictable and
real consequences of self-executing treaties. The use of implementing
legislation or congressional-executive agreements allays these troubling
concerns.
337. See Driessen, supra note 203, at 753-54.
338. See id. at 754.
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